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Abstract
This paper studies the case where a game is played in a particular context. The context
inﬂuences what beliefs players hold. As such, it may aﬀect forward induction reasoning: If
players rule out speciﬁc beliefs, they may not be able to rationalize observed behavior. The
eﬀects are not obvious. Context-laden forward induction may allow outcomes precluded by
context-free forward induction. At the formal level, contextual reasoning is deﬁned within
an epistemic structure. In particular, we represent contextual forward induction reasoning
as “rationality and common strong belief of rationality” (RCSBR) within an arbitrary type
structure. (The concept is due to Battigalli-Siniscalchi [6, 2002].) We ask: What strategies are
consistent with RCSBR (across all type structures)? We show that the RCSBR is characterized
by a solution concept we call Extensive Form Best Response Sets (EFBRS’s). We go on to
study the EFBRS concept in games of interest.
Forward induction is a basic concept in game theory. It reﬂects the idea that players rationalize
their opponents’ behavior, whenever possible. In particular, players form an assessment about the
future play of the game, given the information about the past play and the presumption that their
opponents are strategic. This has implications for the play of the game.
Here, we study the implications of forward induction reasoning when there is a context to the
game. Because there is such a context, a certain event may be “transparent” to the players. That
is, the context may rule out certain beliefs. This may limit the ability of players to rationalize past
behavior, and so may aﬀect forward induction reasoning.
Take the following illustrative example: Consider the case where it is transparent that players all
drive on the right side of the road, irrespective of whether they are driving north or south. Suppose,
further, that it is transparent that players don’t like automobile accidents. Then, if Ann actually
sees Bob drive on the left side of the road, she cannot justify his past behavior. In particular, she
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1cannot justify his behavior by maintaining a hypothesis that Bob thinks she will drive on the left
side of the road–after all, it is transparent that Ann will drive on the right side of the road.
To formalize the notion of context-dependent forward induction reasoning, we need some epis-
temic apparatus: We need to specify what beliefs players do vs. do not consider possible, and the
epistemic structure allows just that. Within the epistemic structure, we analyze forward induction
reasoning. The formalization of forward induction rests on Battigalli-Siniscalchi’s [6, 2002] “strong
belief” idea. (See also Stalnaker [26, 1998].)
We ask: Can we characterize the strategies consistent with context-dependent forward induction
reasoning? That is, can we identify the play consistent with context-dependent forward induction
reasoning, without actually specifying the particular epistemic structure? Indeed we can. We
show that context-dependent forward induction reasoning is captured by a solution concept we call
an extensive-form best response set (EFBRS). In general, there may be many EFBRS’s for a
given game. Which EFBRS obtains depends on the given context.
While the EFBRS deﬁnition is new, we will see that it is equivalent to one already proposed in
the literature–namely, the F-rationalizability concept. This solution concept is due to Battigalli-
Siniscalchi [7, 2003], who referred to it as ∆-rationalizability. We will discuss the connection below.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin, in Section 1, with a heuristic treatment. This gives
an overview of the concepts in the paper, and explains why EFBRS’s capture context-dependent
forward induction reasoning. It also explains the connection to F-rationalizability. We then turn to
the formal treatment. The game and epistemic structure are deﬁned in Sections 2-3. Rationality
and strong belief are deﬁned in Section 4. Section 5 gives the main theorem. We then turn to
applications, in Sections 6-7. Finally, in Section 8, we conclude by discussing certain conceptual and
technical aspects of the paper.
1 Heuristic Treatment
Consider the game of Battle of the Sexes (BoS) with an Outside Option, as given in Figure 1.1. The
standard forward induction analysis results in Bob playing In-Right and Ann playing Down: Begin
with the observation that, independent of Bob’s belief, the strategy In-Left cannot be rational (for
Bob). In particular, the strategy Out dominates In-Left at the beginning of the tree.1 But, notice,
the strategy In-Right may very well be consistent with rationality, e.g., if Bob assigns probability one
to Ann playing Down, then In-Right is a sequential best response. If this is indeed the case, then
conditional upon Ann’s information set being reached, she should rationalize Bob’s past behavior,
assigning probability one to Bob playing In-Right. With this, Ann should play Down. Now, if
Bob begins the game understanding that Ann is rational and rationalizes past behavior, Bob should
begin the game assigning probability one to Down. In this case, Bob should indeed play In-Right.
This is the standard forward induction analysis–in the spirit of Kohlberg-Mertens [16, 1986].
1Note, we often conﬂate a strategy with its associated plan of action. No confusion should result.
2(See, Hillas-Kohlberg [14, 2002; Section 11].) But, arguably, this is an incomplete understanding of
forward induction.
To see this, consider the case where society has formed a “lady’s choice convention.” Loosely:
Everyone in society thinks that, if the lady gets to move in a BoS-like situation, she makes choices
that can lead to her “best payoﬀ.” And, moreover, it is “transparent” that everyone thinks this.
Let us ask, in this case, what are the implications of forward induction reasoning? And, when there
is such a convention, might the lady, perhaps, behave in a manner consistent with the convention
(in this game)?
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Figure 1.1
Because there is a lady’s choice convention, it is thought that, if Ann gets to move, she will play
Up, hoping to get the outcome of 3. Therefore, a rational Bob plays Out. Now, if Ann is given the
opportunity to move, she can no longer rationalize Bob’s behavior–after all, it is transparent that
Bob believes she will play Up and, given this, a rational Bob should have played Out. As such, she
must maintain the hypothesis that Bob is irrational. In this case, conditional upon her information
set being reached, she may very well think that Bob is playing the irrational strategy In-Left. If
she does, Up is indeed a best response. So, if Ann is aﬀorded the opportunity to move, she may
very well make the choice that allows her “best payoﬀ.”
Thus, Out is consistent with forward induction reasoning, under the convention. Of course, the
argument we gave is informal. Can it be formalized? This is what we turn to next.
1.1 The Epistemic Game
We begin by formalizing the idea that a certain event may be transparent to the players. To do so,
we append to the game an epistemic type structure. Let us review the basic elements.
There are two ingredients of an epistemic type structure: First, for each player, there are type
sets Ta and Tb. Informally, each player “knows” his own type, but faces uncertainty about the
strategy the other player will choose and the type of the other player. So, each type ta ∈ Ta is
3associated with a belief on Sb × Tb. Of course, we want to specify a belief at each information set.
Therefore, we map each type into a conditional probability system (CPS) on Sb × Tb, where the
conditioning events correspond to the information sets in the game-tree. That is, for each type,
there is an array of probability measures on Sb × Tb, one for each information set, and this array
satisﬁes the rules of conditional probability when possible. We write β
a for the map from Ta to
CPS’s on Sb × Tb, and, likewise, with a and b interchanged.
How would we model the case of a lady’s choice convention (as applied to the game in Figure
1.1)? We will have type sets Ta and Tb. Ann’s beliefs will be captured by CPS’s on Sb × Tb. In
particular, each type of Ann will be mapped to a CPS on Sb ×Tb. Speciﬁcally, for each such CPS,
there will be a type of Ann, viz. ta, so that β
a (ta) is exactly that CPS. Likewise, Bob’s beliefs will
be captured by CPS’s on Sa × Ta. In particular, now, each type of Bob will be mapped to a CPS
on Sa ×Ta that assigns probability one to {Up}×Ta at each information set. Speciﬁcally, for each
such CPS, there will be a type of Bob, viz. tb, so that β
b ￿
tb￿
is exactly that CPS. (Such a structure
exists. See Appendix A)
Why do these conditions capture the lady’s choice convention? Note, at each information set,
each type of Bob assigns probability one to the event “Ann plays Up,” i.e., to Ann trying to achieve
her “best payoﬀ.” Likewise, at each information set, each type of Ann assigns probability one to
the event “at each information set, Bob assigns probability one to Ann’s playing Up.” And so on.
In this sense, it is “transparent” that Bob believes that, if Ann gets to move, she will play Up.
(Appendix A formalizes the idea that an event is “transparent.”)
Note, the context of the strategic situation determines which beliefs are (or are not) part of
the type structure. Thus, the epistemic type structure is part of the description of the strategic
situation. Put diﬀerently, the strategic situation is described by a game (i.e., a game form and
payoﬀ functions) plus an epistemic type structure. We call this the epistemic game.
1.2 Forward Induction Reasoning
Now, to formalize the idea of forward induction reasoning: Under an epistemic analysis, we talk
about a type of Ann “rationalizing” Bob’s past behavior, when possible. We ask that a type of Ann
maintain a hypothesis that Bob is rational, provided the information she has learned is consistent
with this event. In this case, we say that the type of Ann strongly believes the event “Bob is
rational.” (The idea of strong belief is due to Battigalli-Siniscalchi [6, 2002].) Of course, we will
ask for more–we will ask that Ann strongly believes the event “Bob is rational and Bob strongly
believes I am rational,” etc...
Return to Figure 1.1 and append to the game the epistemic type structure described in Section
1.1. Let us understand forward induction reasoning within this structure.
Begin with rationality. This is a property of a strategy-type pair, i.e., (sa,ta) is rational if
sa is sequentially optimal under the CPS β
a (ta). In our example, there are rational strategy-type
pairs (sa,ta), where sa is Up. There are also rational strategy-type pairs (sa,ta), where sa is Down.
4Turn to Bob. Here, each type tb assigns probability one to Up (at each information set). So, the
set of rational strategy-type pairs for Bob is {Out} × Tb.
So we have: If each player is rational at
￿
sa,ta,sb,tb￿
, then Bob plays Out. But, is such a state
consistent with forward induction reasoning? To answer this, note there are types ta that begin the
game by assigning probability one to the event {Out} × Tb. As such, these types begin the game
with a hypothesis that Bob is rational. If Ann’s information set is reached, Bob cannot be rational.
With this, any such type strongly believes that Bob is rational. So, there are strategy-type pairs
(sa,ta) that are rational and strongly believe Bob is rational. For these pairs, we can again have sa
being Up or Down. Now turn to Bob. Each type of Bob assigns probability one to Ann’s playing
Up, and there are rational strategy type pairs (Up, ta). So, we can ﬁnd types of Bob that assign
probability one to Ann’s rationality at each information set. Certainly these types strongly believe
Ann is rational. Thus, there are strategy-type pairs
￿
sb,tb￿
that are rational and strongly believe
Ann is rational. For these pairs, we have that sb is Out.
Continuing along these lines, we get that, for each m, (i) there are states consistent with “ra-
tionality and mth-order strong belief of rationality,” and (ii) at any such state, Bob plays Out and
Ann plays either Up or Down.
1.3 The Question
We have seen that context-dependent forward induction reasoning may result in a diﬀerent outcome
than the typical forward induction analysis. To see this, we ﬁxed a particular type structure and
analyzed RCSBR within the associated epistemic game.
More generally, given the full epistemic game, we can identify the context-dependent strategies
by analyzing RCSBR. But, what if we (i.e., the analysts) are not given the full epistemic game–that
is, what if we are only given the game tree? Are there observable implications of RCSBR across
all contexts? Can we identify the strategies consistent with context-dependent forward induction
reasoning, by looking only at the game tree? Put diﬀerently, what sets of strategies are consistent
with context-dependent forward induction reasoning (across all contexts)? This is the main question
we ask here.
We will characterize the strategies consistent with RCSBR (across all type structures). In
particular, a set of strategies is consistent with RCSBR (in some structure) if and only if it satisﬁes
certain properties deﬁned on the game tree alone. This will be the basis for the extensive-best
response set concept we mentioned in the Introduction. Using the properties of extensive-form
best response sets, we will be able to make a connection to an old solution concept, namely F-
rationalizability (Battigalli-Siniscalchi [7, 2003]).
51.4 Rationality and Common Strong Belief of Rationality
Let us begin with an arbitrary epistemic game. Refer to Figure 1.2. Here, R0SBR is the set of
states at which each player is rational. R1SBR is the set of states at which each player is rational
and strongly believes “the other player is rational.” More generally, RmSBR is the set of states at
which there is rationality and mth-order strong belief of rationality (RmSBR).
R0SBR
R1SBR
R2SBR
Ta×Tb
Sa×Sb
Figure 1.2
We are interested in the set of states consistent with rationality and common strong belief
of rationality (RCSBR). This is the intersection of the sets RmSBR, across all m. Can we
characterize the strategies played under RCSBR, i.e., the set Qa × Qb in Figure 1.3? For this, ﬁx
some sa ∈ Qa and note that there is some type ta so that (sa,ta) is consistent with RmSBR, for
each m. We will use this to identify two facts about sa.
RCSBR
Ta×Tb
Sa×Sb
Qa×Qb
Figure 1.3
For the ﬁrst fact: Note that sa is optimal under the CPS associated with ta, namely β
a (ta). It
follows that sa is optimal under the marginal of β
a (ta) on Sb (a CPS on Bob’s strategies). For the
second fact, note that ta strongly believes the R0SBR event for Bob, the R1SBR event for Bob, the
6R2SBR event for Bob, etc. So, by a conjunction property of strong belief, ta strongly believes the
RCSBR event for Bob. It then follows from a marginalization property of strong belief that the
marginal of β
a (ta) on Sb strongly believes Qb.
So we have:
For each sa ∈ Qa, there is a CPS on Sb, viz. µa (sa), so that
(i) sa is sequentially optimal under µa (sa), and
(ii) µa (sa) strongly believes Qb;
and likewise with a and b interchanged.
In sum: For a given type structure, the projection of the RCSBR set into Sa × Sb satisﬁes
conditions (i)-(ii). But, do these conditions characterize RCSBR? In particular, given a set Qa×Qb
satisfying conditions (i) and (ii), can we construct a type structure so that Qa×Qb is the projection
of the RCSBR set into Sa × Sb? The answer may be no.
1.5 Maximality
Consider the game in Figure 1.4, and the set Qa ×Qb = {Out}×{Left,Center}. This set satisﬁes
conditions (i)-(ii) in Section 1.4. Begin with Ann and consider the CPS that assigns probability
1
2 : 1
2 to Left : Center, at each information set. The strategy Out is sequentially optimal under
this CPS. Of course, this CPS strongly believes Qb. Turning to Bob, consider a CPS that assigns
probability one to Out at the initial node and probability 1
4 : 1
4 : 1
2 to In-Up : In-Middle : In-Down
conditional upon Bob’s subgame being reached. The strategies Left and Center are sequentially
optimal under this CPS and this CPS strongly believes Qa. So, conditions (i)-(ii) are satisﬁed for
Qa × Qb.
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Figure 1.4
Note, however, there is no type structure so that the projection of the RCSBR set into Sa × Sb
is Qa × Qb. In fact, we can go further: There is no type structure so that Out is consistent with
7RCSBR.
To see this, suppose otherwise, i.e., that we have found a type structure so that Ann’s playing
Out is consistent with RCSBR. Then we have a type ta so that (Out, ta) is consistent with RCSBR.
Certainly, (Out, ta) is rational, and ta strongly believes the event “Bob is rational.” Since each pair
in {Right} × Tb is irrational and ta strongly believes “Bob is rational,” the type ta is associated
with a CPS that (at each node) assigns probability one to {Left,Center} × Tb. Now, since (Out,
ta) is rational, the associated CPS must assign probability 1
2 : 1
2 to {Left}×Tb : {Center}×Tb, at
each node. With this, (In-Up, ta) and (In-Middle, ta) are also rational. Indeed, since ta strongly
believes each of the RmSBR events for Bob, both (In-Up, ta) and (In-Middle, ta) must be consistent
with RCSBR.
Next, consider an RCSBR strategy-type pair for Bob, viz.
￿
sb,tb￿
. Conditional upon Bob’s
information set being reached, tb must assign probability one to {In-Up,In-Middle} × Ta. (To
see this, note that this event contains rational strategy-type pairs, while the event {In-Down}×Ta
does not contain any rational strategy-type pairs.) So, since
￿
sb,tb￿
is rational, sb = Center. As
such, the RCSBR strategy-type pairs for Bob are contained in {Center} × Tb. But, now notice
that the CPS associated with ta does not strongly believe the RCSBR event for Bob. This is a
contradiction.
Let us ask: What went wrong in this example? We began with a set Qa×Qb satisfying conditions
(i)-(ii). In particular, we had a strategy sa ∈ Qa for which there was a unique CPS µa (sa), so that
sa and µa (sa) satisfy conditions (i)-(ii). But, under this CPS, we had a strategy ra ∈ Sa\Qa that
was also sequentially optimal. (Actually, there were two such sequentially optimal strategies in
Sa\Qa.) As such, if (sa,ta) is consistent with RCSBR, then (ra,ta) must also be consistent with
RCSBR. That is, Qa may exclude some strategy of Ann consistent with RCSBR. If so we may be
able to ﬁnd a CPS µb ￿
sb￿
(on Sa) that satisﬁes conditions (i)-(ii) for sb, despite the fact that sb is
not optimal under any CPS (on Sa × Ta) that strongly believes the RCSBR strategy-type pairs for
Ann.
This suggests that we need to add the following maximality criterion to conditions (i)-(ii) of
Section 1.4:
(iii) If ra ∈ Sa is sequentially optimal under µa (sa), then ra ∈ Qa.
We will call a set an extensive-form best response set (EFBRS) if, for each sa ∈ Qa there is
some CPS µa (sa) satisfying conditions (i)-(ii)-(iii), and likewise with a and b interchanged.
1.6 Extensive-Form Best Response Sets
Now we are ready to state the main result, namely a characterization theorem.
Main Theorem
(i) Fix an extensive-form game and an epistemic type structure. The strategies consis-
tent with RCSBR form an EFBRS.
8(ii) Fix an extensive-form game and an associated EFBRS, namely Qa × Qb. Then
there exists an epistemic type structure, so that the strategies consistent with RCSBR
are exactly Qa × Qb.
Return to the Battle of the Sexes with an Outside Option. For that game, there are three
EFBRS’s, namely {Out} × {Up}, {Out} × {Up,Down}, and {In-Right} × {Down}. Thus, each
of these solutions are consistent with forward induction reasoning. Which set obtains depends on
the context within which the game is played, i.e., depends on which events are “transparent” to the
players. See Appendix A for more on this point.
Note, the EFBRS {In-Right} × {Down} corresponds to the usual forward induction analysis.
One situation where this EFBRS obtains is a speciﬁc “context-free” case, where all beliefs are present.
Indeed, this set is also the extensive-form rationalizable (EFR) strategy set. When the type structure
contains all possible beliefs–formally, when the maps β
a and β
b are onto–the projection of the
RCSBR set into Sa × Sb is the extensive-form rationalizable strategy set.2 See Proposition 6 in
Battigalli-Siniscalchi [6, 2002] for a formal statement.
1.7 F-Rationalizability
Return to the “lady’s choice convention,” and the associated type structure in Section 1.1. There,
each type of Bob was associated with some CPS that assigned probability one to {Up}× Ta. This
gives a restriction on Bob’s ﬁrst-order beliefs, i.e., his beliefs about what Ann will choose. Let
Fb represent this restriction on ﬁrst-order beliefs. So, Fb is a subset of the CPS’s on Sa and, in
our example, Fb (only) contains the CPS which assigns probability one to Up. We did not have a
restriction on Ann’s ﬁrst order beliefs. So, we will write Fa for the set of all CPS’s on Sb.
With F = Fa×Fb in hand, we can take an iterative approach to analyzing the game tree–much
like a “typical rationalizability” procedure. On round one, we eliminate In-Left and In-Right for
Bob, since these strategies are not sequentially optimal under the CPS in Fb. We do not eliminate
any of Ann’s strategies, since they are each sequentially optimal under some CPS (in Fa). So,
on round one, we are left with the set {Out} × {Up,Down}. On round two, we note that Out is
sequentially optimal under the CPS in Fb and that CPS strongly believes {Up,Down}. Thus, we
cannot eliminate any strategy of Bob on round two. Likewise, Up (resp. Down) is sequentially
optimal under a CPS that assigns probability one to Out at the initial node, and probability one to
Left (resp. Right) at Bob’s subgame. This CPS is contained in Fa and strongly believes {Out}.
So, we also get {Out} × {Up,Down} on round two. Indeed, a standard induction argument gives
that {Out} × {Up,Down} is the outcome of the procedure. Of course, this was the EFBRS we
identiﬁed in Section 1.2.
The procedure used above is called F-rationalizability. It is due to Battigalli-Siniscalchi [7,
2The condition that βa and βb are onto is known as completeness. It is due to Brandenburger [11, 2003].
92003], who referred to it as ∆-rationalizability.3 The procedure begins by ﬁxing a set of ﬁrst-order
beliefs, i.e., a set F = Fa × Fb, where Fa is a set of CPS’s on Sb and Fb is a set of CPS’s on Sa.
On round one, it eliminates any strategy of Ann (resp. Bob) that is not sequentially optimal under
some CPS in Fa (resp. Fb). On round two, it further eliminates any strategy of Ann (resp. Bob)
that is not sequentially optimal under a CPS in Fa (resp. Fb) that strongly believes the round-one
strategies of Bob (resp. Ann). And so on.
Note, there may be many F-rationalizable sets–each of which is obtained by beginning the
procedure with a diﬀerent set of ﬁrst-order beliefs F = Fa ×Fb. Collecting all the F-rationalizable
sets together, we get the solution concept of F-rationalizability.
1.8 An Alternate Characterization Theorem
In Section 1.7, we considered a particular set of ﬁrst-order beliefs, and we computed the associated
F-rationalizable strategy set. We got the answer {Out}×{Up,Down}. It turned out that this was
one of the EFBRS’s we identiﬁed in Section 1.6, and so is consistent with RCSBR. More generally,
beginning with any set of ﬁrst-order beliefs, viz. F = Fa × Fb, we can always ﬁnd an epistemic
structure so that the F-rationalizable strategy set is the set of strategies consistent with RCSBR. In
particular, we will see that the F-rationalizable strategy set forms an EFBRS–so, the claim follows
from part (ii) of the Main Theorem.
But, what about a converse? In Section 1.7 we began with an epistemic structure and noted
that we can compute the RCSBR strategy set by beginning with some set of ﬁrst-order beliefs, viz.
F = Fa × Fb, and performing the F-rationalizability procedure. Does this hold more generally?
Beginning with some epistemic structure and the RCSBR strategy set, do we always get some
F-rationalizable set (i.e., for some set F = Fa × Fb)?
Indeed, beginning with an epistemic structure and the RCSBR strategy set, we will get some
F-rationalizable set. But, importantly, the approach taken to ﬁnd this F-rationalizable set may be
diﬀerent from the approach we took in Section 1.7. To understand why, let us mimic the route we
took there.
In Section 1.7, we begin with an epistemic structure and use the structure itself to form the
set Fa × Fb. Speciﬁcally, for each type ta ∈ T a, consider the marginal of β
a (ta) on Sb. These
CPS’s form the set Fa. Construct the set Fb analogously. Note, here, the strategies that survive
one round of F-rationalizability are exactly the strategies that are consistent with R0SBR. But, on
round two, we lose the equivalence: If β
a (ta) strongly believes the event “Bob is rational,” then the
marginal of β
a (ta) will also strongly believe that “Bob chooses a strategy consistent with one round
of elimination of F-rationalizability.” (Here, we use a marginalization property of strong belief,
plus the round-one equivalence.) But, the converse need not hold. So, the strategies that survive
two rounds of F-rationalizability may strictly contain the R1SBR strategies. And, on round three,
3Battigalli-Sinsicalchi [7, 2003] introduced the concept to study a diﬀerent problem from the one studied here–
speciﬁcally, in their problem, the set F is given to the analyst. See Section 8a.
10we loose the inclusion. If the CPS β
a (ta) strongly believes the R1SBR event for Bob, then the
marginal of β
a (ta) will also strongly believe that “Bob chooses a strategy consistent with R1SBR.”
But, recall, the strategies consistent with R1SBR may be strictly contained in the strategies that
survive two rounds of F-rationalizability. So β
a (ta) need not strongly believe this latter event.
As such, we loose any relationship between the RCSBR strategies and the Fa × Fb-rationalizable
strategy set.
But, there is another route, that instead uses the EFBRS properties to form the set Fa×Fb. Fix
an epistemic structure. The RCSBR strategies form an EFBRS, viz. Qa × Qb. For each sa ∈ Qa,
we have some CPS µa (sa) satisfying conditions (i)-(ii)-(iii) above. Take Fa to be the set of such
CPS’s, i.e., one for each sa ∈ Qa, and construct Fb similarly. Now we do have an equivalence
between the RCSBR strategies and the F-rationalizable strategies. More precisely, for each m ≥ 1,
Qa × Qb is the set of strategies that survives m-rounds of elimination of F-rationalizability. The
case of m = 1 follows from properties (i) and (iii) of an EFBRS. The case of m = 2 uses condition
(ii) of an EFBRS. And so on, by induction.
In sum:
Alternate Characterization Theorem
(i) Fix an extensive-form game and an epistemic type structure. There exists a set of
ﬁrst-order beliefs F = Fa × Fb so that the set of strategies consistent with RCSBR is
exactly the F-rationalizable strategy set.
(ii) Fix an extensive-form game and a set of ﬁrst-order beliefs F = Fa×Fb. Then there
exists an epistemic type structure, so that the set of strategies consistent with RCSBR
is exactly the F-rationalizable strategy set.
Indeed, the solution concept of F-rationalizability characterizes RCSBR. The diﬀerent components
of this solution correspond to diﬀerent sets of ﬁrst-order beliefs. But, note, it may not be obvious
which F-rationalizable set is associated with a particular type structure. To see this, ﬁx a type
structure and let Ga×Gb be the set of all ﬁrst-order beliefs associated with that particular structure.
The RCSBR strategies form some
￿
Fa × Fb￿
-rationalizable set, but this set may be distinct from
the
￿
Ga × Gb￿
-rationalizable set.
While, in general, it may not be obvious which F-rationalizable set may be associated with a
particular type structure, there is one important case where there is an obvious connection: This is
the case where, in a certain sense, the only restriction on players’ beliefs amounts to a restriction
on ﬁrst-order beliefs, as in the “lady’s choice convention” discussed above. Battigalli-Prestipino
[4, 2009] provide a formal statement. They show that, in this case, the RCSBR strategy set does
correspond to the
￿
Ga × Gb￿
-rationalizable strategy set. (See Section 8a below.)
111.9 The EFBRS Properties
We have seen that the F-rationalizability solution concept also characterizes RCSBR. To show this,
we show it is equivalent to the EFBRS concept. In particular, we begin with the RCSBR strategies
Qa×Qb. We make use of the fact that Qa×Qb satisﬁes the EFBRS properties to show that we can
ﬁnd some set of ﬁrst-order beliefs, viz. F = Fa × Fb, so that the F-rationalizable set is Qa × Qb.
While the EFBRS and F-rationalizability concepts are equivalent, it will often be useful to focus
on the former deﬁnition. The reason is that properties (i), (ii), and (iii) of an EFBRS give some
immediate implications in terms of behavior. In Sections 6-7, we will discuss the consequences of
context-dependent forward reasoning for some speciﬁc games, and, there, the EFBRS properties will
play an important role. We will also see that the properties are analogous to the properties of a
self-admissible set (Brandenburger-Friedenberg-Keisler [13, 2008]), and so there are some interesting
connections in terms of applications.
In Section 8c, we return to further discuss the EFBRS vs. F-rationalizability deﬁnitions.
2 The Game
We consider ﬁnite extensive form games of perfect recall. We write Γ for such a game. The
deﬁnition we consider is similar to that in Osborne-Rubinstein [19, 1994; Deﬁnition 200.1]. In
particular, it allows for simultaneous moves.4
There are two players, namely a (Ann) and b (Bob).5 Let Ca and Cb be choice or action sets
for Ann and Bob. A history for the game consists of (possibly empty) sequences of simultaneous
choices for Ann and Bob. More formally, a history is either (i) the empty sequence, written φ, or
(ii) a sequence of choice pairs (c1,...,cK), where each ck = (ca
k,cb
k) ∈ Ca×Cb. Note, histories have
the property that, if (c1,...,cK) is a history then so is (c1,...,cL), for each L ≤ K. Note that each
history can be viewed as a node in the tree. As such, we will interchangeably use the terms “node”
and “history.”
Write x for a history of the game and let C (x) = {c ∈ Ca×Cb : (x,c) is a history for the game}.
Write Ca (x) = projCa C (x) and Cb (x) = projCb C (x). By assumption, these sets have the property
that C (x) = Ca (x) × Cb (x). The interpretation is that Ca (x) is the set of choices available to
a at history x. If |Ca (x)| ≥ 2, say a moves at history x or a is active at x. (If |Ca (x)| ≤ 1,
a is inactive at history x.) Call x a terminal history for the game if C (x) = ∅. (Terminal
histories can be viewed either as terminal nodes or paths for the game.) Let Ha (resp. Hb) be a
partition of the set of non-terminal histories, with the property that if x, x￿ are contained in the same
partition member, viz. h in Ha (resp. Hb), then Ca (x) = Ca (x￿) (resp. Cb (x) = Cb (x￿)). The
interpretation is that Ha (resp. Hb) is family of information sets for a (resp. b). (Note, perfect
4We choose this deﬁnition to allow simultaneous moves–in particular, this deﬁnition incorporates repeated games
as a special case. Our analysis does not depend on the speciﬁc deﬁnition used.
5The analysis extends to n-player games, up to issues of correlation. See Section 8f.
12recall imposes further requirements on Ha and Hb. See Osborne-Rubinstein [19, 1994; Deﬁnition
203.3].)
Write Z for the set of terminal histories for the game, and let z be an arbitrary element of Z.
Extensive-form payoﬀ functions are given by Πa : Z → R and Πb : Z → R.
We abuse notation and write Ca (h) for the set of choices available to a at information set h ∈ Ha.
With this, the set of strategies for player a is given by Sa =
￿
h∈Ha Ca (h). Deﬁne Sb analogously.
Each pair of strategies
￿
sa,sb￿
induces a path through the tree. Let ζ : Sa × Sb → Z map each
strategy proﬁle into the induced path. Strategic-form payoﬀ functions are given by πa = Πa◦ζ
and πb = Πb ◦ ζ. Given a proﬁle
￿
sa,sb￿
, write π
￿
sa,sb￿
=
￿
πa ￿
sa,sb￿
,πb ￿
sa,sb￿￿
and refer to
this payoﬀ vector as an outcome of the game. Two strategy proﬁles,
￿
sa,sb￿
and
￿
ra,rb￿
, are
outcome equivalent if π
￿
sa,sb￿
= π
￿
ra,rb￿
.
For each information set h, write Sa (h) (resp. Sb (h)) for the set of strategies for a (resp. b)
that allow h. (That is, sa ∈ Sa (h) if there is some sb ∈ Sb so that the path induced by
￿
sa,sb￿
passes through h.) Let Sa (resp. Sb) be the collection of all Sa (h) (resp. Sb (h)) for h ∈ Hb (resp.
h ∈ Ha). Thus, Sa represents the information structure of b about the strategy of a. In particular,
at each of b’s information sets, he will have a belief about a that assigns probability one to the set
of a’s strategies consistent with the information set being reached.
3 The Type Structure
This section appends to the game a type structure, within which the terms ‘rationality’ and ‘strong
belief’ can be deﬁned. Again, this section closely follows Battigalli-Siniscalchi [6, 2002].
Throughout, let Ω be a separable metrizable space and let B(Ω) the Borel σ-algebra on Ω. We
endow the product of separable metrizable spaces with the product topology, and a subset of a
separable metrizable space with the relative topology. Write P (Ω) for the set of Borel probability
measures on Ω, and endow P (Ω) with the topology of weak convergence.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Renyi [23, 1955]) Fix a separable metrizable space Ω and a non-empty collection
of events E ⊆ B(Ω). A conditional probability system (CPS) on (Ω,E) is a mapping µ(·|·) :
B(Ω) × E → [0,1] such that, for any E ∈ B(Ω) and F,G ∈ E,
(i) µ(F|F) = 1,
(ii) µ(·|F) ∈ P (Ω), and
(iii) E ⊆ F ⊆ G implies µ(E|G) = µ(E|F)µ(F|G).
Call ∅ ￿= E ⊆ B(Ω) a collection of conditioning events for Ω.
Write C (Ω,E) for the set of conditional probability systems on (Ω,E). Note, C (Ω,E) can be
viewed as a subset of [P (Ω)]|E|. We endow [P (Ω)]|E| with the product topology and, then, C (Ω,E)
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clear from the context what the set of conditioning events are, we omit reference to E, simply writing
C (Ω).
We will often be interested in product sets. We adopt the convention that if Ω1 × Ω2 = ∅ then
both Ω1 = ∅ and Ω2 = ∅. Fix some E ⊆ B(Ω1), and write E ⊗ Ω2 for the set of all E × Ω2 where
E ∈ E. Note that E ⊗ Ω2 ⊆ B(Ω1 × Ω2).
Consider a CPS µ(·|·) on (Ω1×Ω2,E⊗Ω2), where E ⊆ B(Ω1). Deﬁne ν (·|·) : B(Ω1)×E → [0,1]
so that ν (E|F) = µ(E × Ω2|F × Ω2) for all E ∈ B(Ω1) and F ∈ E. Then ν (·|·) is a conditional
probability system on (Ω1,E). When ν (·|·) is deﬁned in this way, write ν (·|·) = margΩ1 µ(·|·). No
confusion should result.
Deﬁnition 3.2 Fix an extensive-form game Γ. A Γ-based type structure is a collection
￿
Sa,Sb;Sa,Sb;Ta,Tb;β
a,β
b
￿
,
where Ta (resp. Tb) is a nonempty separable metrizable space and β
a : Ta → C
￿
Sb × Tb￿
(resp.
β
b : Tb → C (Sa × Ta)) is a measurable belief map associated with conditioning events Sb⊗Tb (resp.
Sa ⊗ Ta). Members of Ta (resp. Tb) are called types. Members of Sa × Ta × Sb × Tb are called
states.
In Section 1.1 we argued that the type structure captures the idea that certain beliefs are “trans-
parent” to the players. This is true in a precise sense: Begin with Battigalli-Siniscalchi’s [5,
1999] canonical construction of a type structure that contains all hierarchies of conditional beliefs.
Lets us look at the so-called self-evident events within this structure. Loosely, these are events
E ∈ B
￿
Sa × Ta × Sb × Tb￿
, where E obtains and, at each information set, each player assigns
probability one to E, each player assigns probability one to the other player assigning probability
one to E, etc. (Appendix A provides a formal deﬁnition.) Each type structure can be mapped into
the canonical construction and, in a certain sense, each type structure forms a self-evident event in
the canonical construction, i.e., under this mapping. (Note, this assumes a certain bimeasurability
condition.) Furthermore, each self-evident event in the canonical type structure corresponds to a
“smaller” type structure. The formal treatment is provided in Appendix A.
4 Rationality and Strong Belief
We now turn to the main epistemic deﬁnitions, all of which have counterparts with a and b reversed.
Begin by extending πa (·,·) to Sa×P
￿
Sb￿
in the usual way, i.e., πa (sa,µa) =
￿
sb∈Sb πa ￿
sa,sb￿
µa ￿
sb￿
.
(Notice, the measure µa on Sb reﬂects a belief by a about b, so we write µa ∈ P
￿
Sb￿
.)
Deﬁnition 4.1 Fix Xa ⊆ Sa and sa ∈ Xa. Say sa is optimal under µa ∈ P
￿
Sb￿
given Xa if
πa (sa,µa) ≥ πa (ra,µa) for all ra ∈ Xa.
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￿
Sb￿
× Sb → [0,1] if, for
all h with sa ∈ Sa (h), sa is optimal under µa ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
given Sa (h). Say sa ∈ Sa is sequentially
justiﬁable if there exists µa (·|·) : B
￿
Sb￿
× Sb → [0,1] so that sa is sequentially is sequentially
optimal under µa (·|·).
Deﬁnition 4.3 Say (sa,ta) is rational if sa is sequentially optimal under margSb β
a (ta)(·|·).
Let Ra be the set of strategy-type pairs, viz. (sa,ta), at which a is rational.
Deﬁnition 4.4 (Battigalli-Siniscalchi [6, 2002]) Fix a CPS µ(·|·) : B(Ω) × E → [0,1] and an
event E ∈ B(Ω). Say µ strongly believes E if, for each F ∈ E, E ∩ F ￿= ∅ implies µ(E|F) = 1.
We point out two general properties about strong belief.
Property 4.1 (Conjunction) Fix a CPS on (Ω,E), viz. µ(·|·), and a ﬁnite or countable collection
of events E1,E2,.... If µ(·|·) strongly believes E1,E2,... then µ(·|·) strongly believes
￿
m Em.
Property 4.2 (Marginalization) Fix a CPS µ(·|·) on (Ω1 × Ω2,E ⊗ Ω2), where ∅ ￿= E ⊆ B(Ω1).
If µ(·|·) strongly believes E ∈ B(Ω1 × Ω2) and projΩ1 E is Borel, then margΩ1 µ(·|·) strongly believes
projΩ1 E.
Deﬁnition 4.5 Say ta ∈ Ta strongly believes Eb ∈ B
￿
Sb × Tb￿
if β
a (ta) strongly believes Eb.
Fix an event about Bob, viz. Eb ∈ B
￿
Sb × Tb￿
. Write
SB
a ￿
Eb￿
= Sa × {ta ∈ Ta : ta strongly believes Eb},
and CSB
a ￿
Eb￿
= Eb ∩ SB
a ￿
Eb￿
. That is, SB
a ￿
Eb￿
is the event “Ann strongly believes Eb” and
CSB
a ￿
Eb￿
is the event “Ann strongly believes Eb and Eb is in fact correct.” Given a product
set E ∈ B
￿
Sa × Ta × Sb × Tb￿
, viz. E = Ea × Eb, write SB(E) = SB
a ￿
Eb￿
× SB
b(Ea) and
CSB(E) = CSB
a ￿
Eb￿
× CSB
b (Ea).
Note, SB(·) = SB
a (·) × SB
b (·) can be viewed as a mutual strong belief operator. Then,
CSB(·) = CSB
a (·)×CSB
b (·) is an auxiliary operator, which we will refer to as the “correct strong
belief” operator. It will allow us to simplify the formulation of our epistemic assumptions. In
particular, given a product set E ∈ B
￿
Sa × Ta × Sb × Tb￿
, write CSB
0 (E) = E and, for each
m ≥ 0, deﬁne CSB
m+1 (E) = CSB(CSB
m (E)).6 So,
CSB
1 (E) = E ∩ SB(E),
CSB
2 (E) = CSB(E ∩ SB(E)) = E ∩ SB(E) ∩ SB(E ∩ SB(E)),
6Note, we use superscripts both for players and levels of reasoning. No confusion should result.
15and so on. Note that
CSB
m+1 (E) = E ∩
￿m
n=0 SB(CSB
n (E)).
Now we can state the epistemic conditions of interest.
Deﬁnition 4.6 Say there is rationality and common strong belief of rationality (RCSBR)
at (sa,ta,sb,tb) if (sa,ta,sb,tb) ∈
￿
mCSB
m ￿
Ra × Rb￿
.
5 Characterization Theorems
We now turn to characterizing RCSBR. For this it will be useful to introduce a best reply cor-
respondence, viz. ρa : C
￿
Sb × T b,Sb￿
→ 2Sa
, where ρa (µa (·|·)) is the set of strategies that are
sequentially optimal under µa (·|·). We begin with extensive-form best response sets.
Deﬁnition 5.1 Call Qa×Qb ⊆ Sa×Sb an extensive-form best response set (EFBRS) if, for
each sa ∈ Qa there is a CPS µa (·|·) ∈ C
￿
Sb,Sb￿
so that:
(i) sa ∈ ρa (µa (·|·)),
(ii) µa (·|·) strongly believes Qb, and
(iii) ρa (µa (·|·)) ⊆ Qa.
And similarly with a and b reversed.
Theorem 5.1 Fix an extensive-form game Γ.
(i) For any Γ-based type structure, projSa×Sb
￿
m CSB
m￿
Ra × Rb￿
is an EFBRS.
(ii) Fix an EFBRS Qa × Qb. There exists a Γ-based type structure, so that Qa × Qb =
projSa×Sb
￿
m CSB
m ￿
Ra × Rb￿
.
To prove Theorem 5.1, it will be useful to point out a characterization of RCSBR: Let Ra,0 =
Ra (resp. Rb,0 = Rb). Inductively deﬁne Ra,m (resp. Rb,m), so that Ra,(m+1) = Ra,m ∩
SB
a ￿
Rb,m￿
(resp. Rb,(m+1) = Rb,m∩SB
b (Ra,m)). Then, a standard induction argument gives that
CSB
m ￿
Ra × Rb￿
= Ra,m×Rb,m, for each m. It follows that
￿
m CSB
m ￿
Ra × Rb￿
=
￿
m
￿
Ra,m × Rb,m￿
.
We make use of this below.
Proof. Begin with part (i). Fix a Γ-based type structure. If
￿
m CSB
m ￿
Ra × Rb￿
= ∅ then the
result is immediate. So, suppose
￿
m CSB
m ￿
Ra × Rb￿
￿= ∅.
Fix (sa,sb) ∈ projSa×Sb
￿
m CSB
m ￿
Ra × Rb￿
. Then there exists (ta,tb) such that
￿
sa,ta,sb,tb￿
∈
￿
m CSB
m ￿
Ra × Rb￿
=
￿
m(Ra,m × Rb,m).
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a (ta) satisﬁes conditions (i)-(iii) for sa. A similar argument
holds for sb.
First note,
(sa,ta) ∈ ρa (margSb β
a (ta)) × {ta} ⊆ Ra.
Now use the fact that ta strongly believes each Rb
m to get that
ρa (margSb β
a (ta)) × {ta} ⊆
￿
m Ra,m.
So, sa ∈ ρa (margSb β
a (ta)) ⊆ projSa
￿
m Ra,m, establishing conditions (i) and (iii). Next note that,
using the Conjunction Property of strong belief (Property 4.1), β
a (ta) strongly believes
￿
m Rb,m.
Using the Marginalization Property (Property 4.2), margSa β
a (ta) strongly believes projSb
￿
m Rb,m.
This establishes condition (ii).
Now turn to part (ii) of the Theorem. Fix an EFBRS Qa×Qb ￿= ∅. Let Ta = Qa and Tb = Qb.
Fix a type ta ∈ Ta = Qa. There is a CPS µa (ta)(·|·) ∈ C
￿
Sb￿
satisfying conditions (i)-(iii) of an
EFBRS. Now construct a CPS β
a (ta) ∈ C
￿
Sb × Tb,Sb ⊗ Tb￿
as follows. If Qb ∩ Sb (h) ￿= ∅, set
β
a (ta)
￿￿
tb,tb￿
|Sb (h) × Tb￿
= µa (ta)
￿
tb|Sb (h)
￿
for each tb ∈ Qb = Tb. Next, ﬁx some arbitrary
element tb
∗ ∈ T b. Then, if Qb ∩Sb (h) = ∅, set β
a (ta)
￿￿
sb,tb
∗
￿
|Sb (h) × Tb￿
= µa (ta)
￿
sb|Sb (h)
￿
for
each sb ∈ Sb. (Note, tb
∗ is the same, for each information set with Qb ∩ Sb (h) = ∅.)
Indeed, each β
a (ta) is a CPS on Sb⊗Tb. Note that conditions (i)-(ii) of a CPS are immediate. For
condition (iii), ﬁx an event Eb and two information sets h,i ∈ Ha with Eb ⊆ Sb (h)×Tb ⊆ Sb (i)×Tb.
First, consider the case where Qb ∩ Sb (h) ￿= ∅. In this case, Qb ∩ Sb (i) ￿= ∅. So,
β
a (ta)
￿
Eb|Sb (i) × Tb￿
= µa (ta)
￿￿
tb ∈ Qb :
￿
tb,tb￿
∈ Eb￿
|Sb (i)
￿
= µa (ta)
￿￿
tb ∈ Qb :
￿
tb,tb￿
∈ Eb￿
|Sb (h)
￿
× µa (ta)
￿
Sb (h)|Sb (i)
￿
= µa (ta)
￿￿
tb ∈ Qb :
￿
tb,tb￿
∈ Eb￿
|Sb (h)
￿
× µa (ta)
￿
Qb ∩ Sb (h)|Sb (i)
￿
= β
a (ta)
￿
Eb|Sb (h) × Tb￿
× β
a (ta)
￿
Sb (h) × Tb|Sb (i) × Tb￿
,
where the ﬁrst and fourth lines follow from the construction, the second follows from the fact
that µa (ta)(·|·) is a CPS, and the third line follows from the fact that µa (ta)
￿
Qb|Sb (h)
￿
= 1 (i.e.,
µa (ta)(·|·) strongly believes Qb). This establishes condition (iii) when Qb∩Sb (h) ￿= ∅. So, suppose
Qb ∩ Sb (h) = ∅ and recall Eb ⊆ Sb (h) × Tb. If Qb ∩ Sb (i) ￿= ∅, then µa (ta)
￿
projSb Eb|Sb (i)
￿
= 0
and µa (ta)
￿
Sb (h)|Sb (i)
￿
= 0. (This uses the fact that µa (ta)
￿
Qb|Sb (i)
￿
= 1.) So, here too,
β
a (ta)
￿
Eb|Sb (i) × Tb￿
= β
a (ta)
￿
Eb|Sb (h) × Tb￿
× β
a (ta)
￿
Sb (h) × Tb|Sb (i) × Tb￿
= 0.
Finally, suppose Qb ∩ Sb (i) = ∅. Here,
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a (ta)
￿
Eb|Sb (i) × Tb￿
= µa (ta)
￿￿
sb :
￿
sb,tb
∗
￿
∈ Eb￿
|Sb (i)
￿
= µa (ta)
￿￿
sb :
￿
sb,tb
∗
￿
∈ Eb￿
|Sb (h)
￿
× µa (ta)
￿
Sb (h)|Sb (i)
￿
= β
a (ta)
￿
Eb|Sb (h) × Tb￿
× β
a (ta)
￿
Sb (h) × {tb
∗}|Sb (i) × Tb￿
= β
a (ta)
￿
Eb|Sb (h) × Tb￿
× β
a (ta)
￿
Sb (h) × Tb|Sb (i) × Tb￿
,
as required.
We will conclude the proof by showing
Qa =
￿
ta∈Ta[ρa (margSb β
a (ta))] (5.1)
Ra,m =
￿
ta∈Ta[ρa (margSb β
a (ta)) × {ta}] for each m, (5.2)
and likewise with a and b interchanged. Taken together, they give the desired result.
To show Equation 5.1: Recall, for each ta ∈ Ta = Qa , µa(ta)(·|·) = margSb β
a (ta)(·|·). So, it is
immediate from the construction that Qa ⊆
￿
ta∈Ta ρa (margSb β
a (ta)). Conversely, ﬁx any strategy
sa in
￿
ta∈Ta ρa (margSb β
a (ta)). Then, there is a type ta ∈ Ta = Qa so that sa is sequentially
optimal under µa (ta)(·|·). It follows from part (iii) of the deﬁnition of an EFBRS that sa ∈ Qa.
To show Equation 5.2: The proof is by induction on m. The Equation is immediate for m = 0.
Assume the result holds for m ≥ 0. In order to show that it holds for m + 1, it suﬃces to
show that each ta ∈ Ta strongly believes Rb,m. For this, ﬁx an information set h such that
Rb,m ∩
￿
Sb (h) × Tb￿
￿= ∅. Observe that
[projSb Rb,m] ∩ Sb (h) =
￿￿
tb∈Tb ρb
￿
margSa β
b ￿
tb￿￿￿
∩ Sb (h)
= Qb ∩ Sb (h).
(The ﬁrst equality follows from the induction hypothesis for b. The second equality follows
from Equation 5.1.) Since Rb,m ∩
￿
Sb (h) × Tb￿
￿= ∅, it follows that Qb ∩ Sb (h) ￿= ∅, and so
µa (ta)
￿
Qb|Sb (h)
￿
= 1. (Here, we use part (ii) of the deﬁnition of an EFBRS.) So, by construction,
β
a (ta)
￿
Rb,m|Sb (h) × Tb￿
= 1, as required.
Now, we turn to F-rationalizability. Let Fa (resp. Fb) be a non-empty subset of C
￿
Sb￿
(resp.
C (Sa)), i.e. a set of ﬁrst-order beliefs of Ann (resp. Bob). Call F = Fa × Fb a set of ﬁrst-order
beliefs. Set S
a,0
F = Sa and S
b,0
F = Sb. Inductively deﬁne S
a,m
F and S
b,m
F as follows: Let S
a,m+1
F
be the set of all sa ∈ S
a,m
F so that, there is some CPS µa ∈ Fa with (i) sa ∈ ρa (µa) and (ii) µa
strongly believes S
b,m
F . And, likewise, with a and b interchanged.
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Battigalli-Siniscalchi [7, 2003]) Call Sa
F =
￿
m≥0 S
a,m
F (resp. Sb
F =
￿
m≥0 S
b,m
F )
the F-rationalizable strategies of Ann (resp. Bob). Call Sa
F ×Sb
F the F-rationalizable strat-
18egy set.
Note, since the sets S
a,m
F × S
b,m
F form a decreasing sequence and Sa × Sb is ﬁnite, there is some
(ﬁnite) M so that Sa
F × Sb
F = S
a,M
F × S
b,M
F . Also, note that, for a given set of ﬁrst-order beliefs,
viz. F = Fa × Fb, the F-rationalizable strategy set may be empty.
Proposition 5.1 Fix an extensive-form game Γ.
(i) Given a set of ﬁrst-order beliefs, viz. F = Fa × Fb, Sa
F × Sb
F is an EFBRS.
(ii) Given an EFBRS, viz. Qa × Qb, there exists a set of ﬁrst-order beliefs, viz. F = Fa × Fb, so
that Sa
F × Sb
F = Qa × Qb.
Thus, in conjunction with Theorem 5.1, we have the following characterization theorem.
Corollary 5.1 Fix an extensive-form game Γ.
(i) For any Γ-based type structure, there exists a set of ﬁrst-order beliefs, viz. F = Fa × Fb, so
that Sa
F × Sb
F = projSa×Sb
￿
m CSB
m ￿
Ra × Rb￿
.
(ii) Fix a set of ﬁrst-order beliefs, viz. Fa × Fb. Then there exists a Γ-based structure, so that
Sa
F × Sb
F = projSa×Sb
￿
m CSB
m￿
Ra × Rb￿
.
Now for the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. Begin with part (i), and some set of ﬁrst-order beliefs, viz. F =
Fa × Fb. Note, there exists some M with Sa
F × Sb
F = S
a,M
F × S
b,M
F . Fix sa ∈ Sa
F = S
a,M+1
F . By
Lemma C1 in Appendix C, we can ﬁnd a CPS µa (·|·) so that sa ∈ ρa (µa (·|·)) and µa (·|·) strongly
believes each S
b,m
F for m ≤ M. Thus, sa satisﬁes conditions (i)-(ii) of Deﬁnition 5.1. Moreover, if
ra ∈ ρa (µa (·|·)), then ra is optimal under a CPS that strongly believes each S
b,m
F , for m ≤ M. As
such, ra ∈ S
a,m
F for each m ≤ M, establishing that ra ∈ Sa
F.
Now turn to part (ii). Fix Qa × Qb. For each sa ∈ Qa, there exists some CPS µa (sa) ∈ C
￿
Sb￿
satisfying conditions (i)-(iii) of an EFBRS. Take Fa so that, for each sa ∈ Qa, Fa contains exactly
one such CPS µa (sa) (and no other CPS’s). And, likewise, with a and b interchanged. We will
show that, for each m ≥ 1, S
a,m
F × S
b,m
F = Qa × Qb. This will establish the result.
The proof is by induction. Begin with m = 1. Certainly Qa ⊆ S
a,1
F . Fix sa ∈ S
a,1
F . Then
there exists some µa (ra) ∈ S
a,1
F so that sa is sequentially optimal under µa (ra). This CPS µa (ra)
is associated with some ra ∈ Qa, i.e., so that ra and µa (ra) jointly satisfy conditions (i)-(iii) of an
EFBRS. So, we can apply condition (iii) of an EFBRS to get that sa ∈ Qa. And, likewise, for b.
Now assume the results holds for m ≥ 2. We will show it also holds for m + 1. Fix sa ∈ Qa =
S
a,m
F . Then, using conditions (i)-(ii) of an EFBRS, there exists some µa (sa) so that sa ∈ ρa (µa (sa))
and µa (sa) strongly believes Qb = S
b,m
F . So, certainly, Qa ⊆ S
a,(m+1)
F . Conversely, ﬁx some
sa ∈ S
a,(m+1)
F . Then, there exists a CPS µa (ra) ∈ Fa so that sa ∈ ρa (µ(ra)) and µa (ra) strongly
19believes S
b,m
F . Again, since µa (ra) satisﬁes conditions (i)-(iii) of an EFBRS for some ra ∈ Qa, it
follows that ρa (µa (ra)) ⊆ Qa, and so sa ∈ Qa.
Let us comment on the proof. Begin with some ﬁnite set of ﬁrst-order beliefs, viz. F. Proposition
5.1(i) says that Sa
F×Fb
F is an EFBRS. Conversely, begin with some EFBRS. The proof of Proposition
5.1(ii) says that we can ﬁnd a ﬁnite set of ﬁrst-order beliefs, viz. F, so that Sa
F ×Sb
F is this EFBRS.
With this in mind:
Remark 5.1 The set of all F-rationalizable strategy sets is the set
{Sa
F × Sb
F : F = Fa × Fb ⊆ C
￿
Sb￿
× C (Sa) is ﬁnite}.
Thus, using the EFBRS properties, we can see that we only need to compute the F-rationalizable
sets for ﬁnite sets of ﬁrst-order beliefs.
6 Examples
We have seen that RCSBR is characterized by the EFBRS concept or, equivalently, by the F-
rationalizability concept. Now, we ask what this gives in games of interest. For this, it will be
helpful to make use of the EFBRS properties. (In fact, we will only need to make use of Properties
(i)-(ii).) Let us begin with Centipede.
Example 6.1 Consider the three-legged Centipede game, given in Figure 6.1 below.
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Figure 6.1
Here, the EFBRS’s are {Out} × {Out} and {Out} × {Out,In}.
Notice, we cannot have an EFBRS where Ann plays In at the ﬁrst node. To see this, suppose
otherwise, i.e., there exists an EFBRS Qa × Qb and a strategy sa ∈ Qa where sa plays In at the
ﬁrst node. Note, by condition (i) of an EFBRS, we must have that Qa ⊆ {Out,In-Down}, so that
sa = In-Down. Now, ﬁx sb ∈ Qb and note that sb is sequentially optimal under a CPS that strongly
believes Qa. Then, at Bob’s information set, this CPS must assign probability one to In-Down.
Since sb is sequentially optimal under this CPS, sb = Out. So, we have that Qb = {Out}. But,
then, In-Down cannot simultaneously satisfy conditions (i)-(ii) of an EFBRS.
20The argument we have presented for the three-legged Centipede is more general. In particular,
ﬁx an EFBRS for an n-legged Centipede game. Under the EFBRS, the ﬁrst player chooses Out.
This will be a consequence of Proposition 7.1(i) to come.
Example 6.2 Figure 6.2 gives the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Consider the 3-repeated version of the
game.
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Figure 6.2
Let Qa×Qb be a nonempty EFBRS. Then each
￿
sa,sb￿
∈ Qa×Qb results in the Defect-Defect path.
Let us give an intuition: First, note, each strategy sa ∈ Qa (resp. sb ∈ Qb) is sequentially
justiﬁable. (This is condition (i).) As such, sa (resp. sb) plays defect in the last period, at each
history allowed by sa (resp. sb). Now, consider a second period information set h, where sa ∈ Sa (h)
and Qb ∩ Sb (h) ￿= ∅. By conditions (i)-(ii) of an EFBRS, sa must be sequentially optimal under a
CPS µa (sa) with µa (sa)
￿
Qb|Sb (h)
￿
= 1. Note, then, conditional upon h, µa (sa) assigns probability
one to Bob defecting in the third period, irrespective of Ann’s play. As such, sa (h) = D. And,
likewise, with a and b reversed.
Now turn to the ﬁrst period, and suppose, contra hypothesis, sa (φ) = C for some sa ∈ Qa.
Note, for each sa ∈ Qb,
￿
sa,sb￿
results in the Defect-Defect path in periods two and three. So,
Ann’s expected payoﬀs from sa corresponds to her ﬁrst period expected payoﬀs from playing sa. Now
note that, the Defect-always strategy yields a strictly higher expected payoﬀ in the ﬁrst period and
an expected payoﬀ of at least zero in subsequent periods. As such, this contradicts sa being optimal
under µa (sa)
￿
·|Sb￿
.
An analogous result holds for the N-repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, for N ﬁnite. The proof is
given in Appendix D.
A B
1
1
2
2
3
3
Out Out
In In A
0
0
Down
Across
Figure 6.3
21Example 6.3 Consider the coordination game in Figure 6.3. Here, there are three EFBRS’s,
namely {Out}×{Out}, {Out}×{Out,In}, and {In-Across}×{In}. The EFBRS {In-Across}×
{In} corresponds to the backward induction outcome, but the other two EFBRS’s do not.
Taken together with the Main Theorem (Theorem 5.1), we get that a non-backward induction
outcome, namely (2,2), is consistent with RCSBR. To understand this better, note that Out is the
unique best response for Ann, under a CPS that assigns probability one to Out at the initial node.
So, if each type of Ann assigns probability one to {Out} × Tb, then conditional upon Bob’s node
begin reached, he must maintain a hypothesis that Ann is irrational. In this case, Bob may very
well maintain a hypothesis that Ann is playing In-Down. If a type tb of Bob does maintain such a
hypothesis, Out is a unique best response for tb.
7 Perfect Information Games
Here, we turn to analyzing EFBRS’s in perfect-information games, i.e., games where each information
set is a singleton and there is at most one active player at each information set. We’ve seen two
examples of perfect-information games, namely Examples 6.1 and 6.3. In the former case, each
EFBRS was outcome equivalent to the backward induction outcome. Of course, for that game, the
Nash and backward induction outcomes coincide. On the other hand, in Example 6.3, one EFBRS
corresponds to the backward induction outcome, but others do not. However, there we do get that
the EFBRS’s correspond (exactly) to the Nash outcomes of the game.
The examples suggest there may be a connection between EFBRS’s and Nash outcomes, at least
for perfect-information (PI) games. (Of course, for non-PI games, an EFBRS may give non-Nash
outcomes.) Indeed, there will be a connection, for PI games satisfying a “no ties” condition. Let
us begin with two such conditions.
Deﬁnition 7.1 (Brandenburger-Friedenberg [12, 2004]) A game satisﬁes the single payoﬀ
condition (SPC) if, for all terminal nodes z and z￿, the following holds: If a moves at the last
common predecessor of z and z￿, then Πa (z) = Πa (z￿) implies Πb (z) = Πb (z￿). And similarly with
a and b interchanged.
Deﬁnition 7.2 (Battigalli [3, 1997]) A game satisﬁes no relevant ties (NRT) if, for all ter-
minal nodes z and z￿, the following holds: If a moves at the last common predecessor of z and z￿,
then Πa (z) ￿= Πa (z￿). And similarly for b.
A game with no ties satisﬁes NRT, but the converse does not hold. Reny’s [22, 1993; Figure 1]
Take-It-Or-Leave-It game is one such example. Likewise, a game satisfying NRT also satisﬁes SPC.
Yet, many games of interest satisfy SPC, but fail NRT. Zero sum games satisfy SPC, but need not
satisfy NRT. In perfect-information games, SPC is equivalent to “transference of decision-maker
22indiﬀerence” (Marx-Swinkels [18, 1997]).7
Now let us state the connection:
Proposition 7.1
(i) Fix a PI game Γ satisfying SPC. If Qa×Qb is an EFBRS then, there exists a Nash equilibrium,
viz.
￿
sa,sb￿
, so that each proﬁle in Qa × Qb is outcome equivalent to
￿
sa,sb￿
.
(ii) Fix a PI game Γ satisfying NRT. If
￿
sa,sb￿
is a Nash equilibrium in sequentially justiﬁable
strategies, then there is an EFBRS, viz. Qa × Qb, so that
￿
sa,sb￿
∈ Qa × Qb.
The proof can be found in Appendix E. Taken together Theorem 5.1 and Proposition 7.1 give:
Corollary 7.1
(i) Fix a PI game Γ satisfying SPC, and an epistemic type structure. Each state at which there
is RCSBR is outcome equivalent to some Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Fix a PI game Γ satisfying NRT, and a Nash equilibrium in sequentially justiﬁable strategies.
Then, there exists an epistemic structure and a state thereof at which there is RCSBR and the
Nash equilibrium is played.
Why the connection between EFBRS’s and Nash equilibria? Recall, the Preliminary Observation
in Aumann-Brandenburger [1, 1995]: If each player is “rational,” i.e., plays a best response, and
places probability one on the actual strategy choices by the other player, then the strategy choices
constitute a Nash equilibrium. In a PI game satisfying SPC, RCSBR imposes a form of correct
beliefs about the actual outcomes that will obtain. Let us recast this at the level of the solution
concept: In a PI game satisfying SPC, each strategy proﬁle in a given EFBRS is outcome equivalent.
(This will be Lemma E2 in Appendix E.) So, along the path of play, the associated CPS(’s) must
assign probability one to a particular outcome–the outcome associated with the EFBRS, i.e., the
“correct” outcome. (This uses condition (ii) of an EFBRS.) With this, we get a Nash outcome
(but not necessarily the Nash strategies).
This was the intuition for part (i) of Corollary 7.1. The proof follows the proof of Proposition
6.1a in Brandenburger-Friedenberg [12, 2004], though now making use of the EFBRS properties.
(The proof in [12, 2004] makes use of properties of self-admissible sets. See 8c below.) Indeed, we
only need use properties (i)-(ii) of Deﬁnition 5.1.
The converse, i.e., part (ii), is novel. A Nash equilibrium in sequentially justiﬁable strategies will,
in general, satisfy conditions (i)-(ii) of an EFBRS. However, it may fail the maximality criterion.
Indeed, the proof makes use of all three properties of Deﬁnition 5.1. See Appendix E.
The no ties conditions are important for both directions of Proposition 7.1. We explain why, by
way of a number of examples.
7The SPC is a condition stated on the tree. Transference of decision-maker indiﬀerence is stated on the matrix.
Here, it will be convenient to use a condition deﬁned on the tree.
23Example 7.1 Consider the game in Figure 7.1, which shows that part (i) of Proposition 7.1 is false,
absent the SPC condition.8
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Here, {In} × {Across,Down} is an EFBRS, but (In,Down) is not outcome equivalent to a Nash
Equilibrium.
In the above example, when Bob moves, he is indiﬀerent between In and Out. Now turn to a
type of Ann that strongly believes Bob is rational. This type has a correct belief about what Bob’s
payoﬀs will be if she plays In. But, because the game fails SPC, she may have an incorrect belief
about what her payoﬀ will be if she plays In. As such, a Nash outcome need not obtain.
The next example shows that part (ii) of Proposition 7.1 may be false, if we replace the NRT
condition with the SPC condition.
Example 7.2 Consider the game in Figure 7.2, which satisﬁes SPC.
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Figure 7.2
Here, (Out,Out) is a Nash equilibrium in sequentially justiﬁable strategies. But, if Qa × Qb is a
(nonempty) EFBRS, then Qa × Qb = {In-Across} × {In-Down}. To see this, let Qa × Qb ￿= ∅
be an EFBRS and note that Qa ⊆ {Out,In-Across} and Qb ⊆ {Out,In-Down}. (The strategy
In-Down for Ann is dominated at her second information set, and the strategy In-Across for Bob
is dominated at his second information set.) Note, too, that In-Across is a weakly dominant
strategy for Ann. So, condition (iii) of an EFBRS implies that In-Across ∈ Qa. It follows that,
if µb strongly believes Qa, then µb must assign probability one to In-Across conditional on the
8This example was suggested by Drew Fudenberg. It is also Example 6.2 in Brandenburger-Friedenberg [12,
2004].
24event {In-Across,In-Down}. So, In-Down is Bob’s only sequential best response to any CPS that
strongly believes Qa. This implies that Qb = {In-Down}, and so Qa = {In-Across}.
Do note: In the above example, {(Out,Out)} is disjoint from any EFBRS. While it satisﬁes
conditions (i)-(ii) of an EFBRS, it fails condition (iii): If (Out,Out) is played, Ann gets a payoﬀ of
2. But, by going In, she can also assure herself an expected payoﬀ of at least 2. As such, condition
(iii) requires that we include In-Across.
To better understand what is going on, let us recast this at the epistemic level: If (Out,ta) is
rational, so is (In-Across,ta). With this, if Bob strongly believes that Ann is rational, then, when
his ﬁrst information set is reached, he must maintain a hypothesis that Ann is playing In-Across–
that is, he must maintain a hypothesis that Ann is playing a particular strategy that is not in
Qa = {Out}. As such, Out cannot be a best response for Bob.
The key is that the rationality of (Out,ta) has implications for Ann’s rationality at information
sets precluded by Out. Notice, this happens because Ann is indiﬀerent between the terminal nodes
reached by (Out,Out) and (In-Across,Out). (If Ann’s payoﬀs from (In-Across,Out) were strictly
less than 2, (Out,ta) can be rational without (In-Across,ta) being rational. Similarly, if Ann’s
payoﬀs from (In-Across,Out) were strictly greater than 2, then (Out,Out) would not be a Nash
Equilibrium.) This is where the NRT condition comes in–it says that, if Ann is decisive between
two terminal nodes (as she is here), then she cannot be indiﬀerent between those nodes.
Finally, let us note a gap between parts (i)-(ii) of Proposition 7.1. In particular, part (i) says
that starting from an EFBRS we can get a Nash outcome, while part (ii) says that starting from a
sequentially justiﬁable Nash equilibrium, we can get an EFBRS.
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We cannot improve part (ii) to say that, starting from a Nash outcome, we get an EFBRS. To
see this, refer to Figure 7.3. There is a unique EFBRS, namely {In} × {Across}. That said,
the pair (Out,Down) is a Nash equilibrium–of course, it is not a Nash equilibrium in sequentially
justiﬁable strategies. Can we improve part (i) to say that, starting from an EFBRS, we get a Nash
equilibrium in sequentially justiﬁable strategies? We do not know. In Appendix E, we elaborate
on this issue.
258 Discussion Section
In this section, we discuss some conceptual aspects of the paper, as well as some extensions.
a. The Question: Here, we study context-dependent forward induction reasoning. We focus on
the case where the analyst does not know the speciﬁc context within which the game is played. With
this in mind, we ask: Can we characterize RCSBR (i.e., across all type structures)? Indeed we can.
We have seen that the EFBRS concept does just that. Or, alternatively, that the F-rationalizability
solution concept characterizes RCSBR across all type structures.
Note, carefully, that Battigalli-Siniscalchi [7, 2003] introduced the F-rationalizability procedure
as an answer to a diﬀerent question: They were interested in the case where the analyst knows
the particular context, and the context only imposes a restriction on players’ ﬁrst-order beliefs.9
Speciﬁcally, the analyst is given a set of ﬁrst-order beliefs, viz. Fa×Fb, which satisﬁes two conditions:
(i) each type ta has margSb β
a (ta) contained in Fa and (ii) for each CPS µa on Sb × Tb with
margSb µa ∈ Fa, there is a type ta with β
a (ta) = µa. And, likewise, with a and b interchanged.
Battigalli-Siniscalchi [8, 2007] and Battigalli-Prestipino [4, 2009] provide (distinct) formal treatments
along these lines. They each get the Fa × Fb-rationalizable strategy set, as an output.
b. Two Characterization Theorems: We have provided two characterizations of RCSBR–
namely, the EFBRS solution concept and the F-rationalizability solution concept. While Proposi-
tion 5.1 shows that the two concepts are in a sense equivalent, we think that it is valuable to have
both deﬁnitions on the table.
For the F-rationalizability deﬁnition: We already mentioned that there are times where the
analyst understands that the context only imposes particular restrictions on players’ ﬁrst-order
beliefs. In this case, the F-rationalizability procedure is useful. (See part a of this Section.)
For the EFBRS deﬁnition: Often times, this deﬁnition is operationally “more convenient.” We
have seen that the EFBRS properties give us insight into behavior in games. Moreover, there is a
sense in which it may be “easier” to compute the solution concept, when beginning from the EFBRS
deﬁnition vs. the F-rationalizability deﬁnition. In particular, to compute the concept according to
the F-rationalizability deﬁnition, we must begin with each ﬁnite set of ﬁrst-order beliefs and run the
F-rationalizability procedure relative to each such set. (See Remark 5.1.) The set of all such ﬁnite
sets has the cardinality of the continuum. On the other hand, to compute the concept according
to the EFBRS deﬁnition, we begin with a subset of strategies, viz. Qa × Qb, and verify conditions
(i)-(iii) of Deﬁnition 5.1. There are a ﬁnite number of such sets Qa × Qb.10
9This case is perhaps more relevant for applications of the theory of games with incomplete information, which is
the focus of Battigalli-Siniscalchi[7]: An example of ﬁrst-order restrictions “known to the analyst” is that hierarchies
of initial beliefs about states of nature are derived from a given information structure.
10But, we don’t want to make too much of this point: Fix some Qa ×Qb. To check whether a particular strategy
satisﬁes Deﬁnition 5.1, we must ﬁnd some CPS satisfying conditions (i)-(iii). The set of all CPS’s also has the
cardinality of the continuum. In light of this, it may not be all that simple to check the EFBRS deﬁnition.
26c. Properties of EFBRS’s: Refer back to Sections 6-7. To analyze games of interest, we made
use of the three properties of an EFBRS. Many of these arguments drew from Brandenburger-
Friedenberg’s [12, 2004] analysis of self-admissible sets: They began with properties of self-admissible
sets (SAS’s) and, analogously, used these properties to draw implications in terms of behavior in
games.
While there is a close connection between the EFBRS properties and the SAS properties, there
are also important points of diﬀerence. Indeed, the concepts are distinct. For an SAS, viz. Qa×Qb,
each sa ∈ Qa must be admissible (i.e., not weakly dominated) in both the matrices Sa × Sb and
Sa × Qb. For an EFBRS, we only require that each sa ∈ Qa must be sequentially optimal under a
CPS that strongly believes Qb. If sa meets the former criterion, it meets the latter criterion, but
the converse need not hold. So, in this sense, it is harder to meet the SAS criterion vs. the EFBRS
criterion. On the other hand, SAS also has a maximality criterion, and it is easier to meet the SAS
maximality criterion vs. the EFBRS maximality criterion.
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Figure 8.1
Putting these considerations together, we can have an EFBRS that is not an SAS, and an SAS
that is not an EFBRS. To see that an EFBRS need not be an SAS, refer to Figure 8.1. There,
{Out} × {Left,Right} is an EFBRS, but the only SAS is {In−Down} × {Right}. (Here, we use
the admissibility criteria of SAS’s.) To see that an SAS need not be an EFBRS, refer to Figure
1.4. There, {Out} ×{Left,Center} is an SAS, but the only EFBRS is {In−Middle} ×{Center}.
(Here, we use the fact that it is easier to meet the maximality criteria for SAS’s vs. EFBRS’s.)
d. A Dominance Characterization of EFBRS’s: Fix a simultaneous move game and an
associated type structure. Let us consider the conditions of “rationality and common belief of
rationality.” Here, we get, as an output, a best response set (Pearce [20, 1984]) Qa × Qb. The
deﬁnition of a best response set can be given both in terms of rationalizability (i.e., each sa ∈ Qa
is optimal under a measure that assigns probability one to Qb) and in terms of dominance (i.e.,
27each sa ∈ Qa is undominated in the matrix Sa × Qb). Likewise, if we consider the self-admissible
set (Brandenburger-Friedenberg-Keisler [13, 2008]) concept, we can also provide a deﬁnition both in
terms of rationalizability and in terms of dominance.
Here, we have provided a rationalizability deﬁnition of an EFBRS. On the game tree, the
appropriate notion of dominance is “conditional dominance,” i.e., undominated at each information
set. (See Shimoji-Watson [24, 1998].) What about a conditional dominance characterization of an
EFBRS? We don’t know of such a characterization and leave it as an open question.
Let us comment on the essential diﬃculty in ﬁnding such a deﬁnition. It comes down to
the maximality criterion. Deﬁnition 5.1 requires that we ﬁnd some CPS µa that–in addition to
satisfying conditions (i)-(ii)–also satisﬁes the requirement that, if ra is sequentially optimal under
µa, then ra ∈ Qa. Of course, strategies ra that are sequentially optimal under µa are conditionally
undominated (see [24, 1998; Lemma 2]), but a conditionally undominated strategy need not be
sequentially optimal under the given CPS µa. Thus, we need a criterion to precisely say which
conditionally undominated strategies ra must be included in Qa.
There is a certain instance in which there is a clear criterion to say precisely which conditionally
undominated strategies must be included in Qa. Speciﬁcally, ﬁx some sa ∈ Qa and some ra that only
allows information sets allowed by sa. Here, we can build on the maximality criterion in [13, 2008],
to give a precise criterion in terms of dominance. For simultaneous move games, any information
set allowed by any strategy ra is also allowed by sa. So, again, for simultaneous move games we
can specify the appropriate maximality criterion. But, of course, for extensive-form games more
generally, this condition need not be met. In this case, the dominance criterion is not obvious–at
least not to us.
We expand on these points in the Online Appendix.
e. Existence of EFBRS’s: Note, the extensive-form rationalizable strategies form an EFBRS.
(This is easily seen from Proposition 5.1, taking Fa ×Fb to be the set of all CPS’s.) As such, there
exists a non-empty EFBRS. See Battigalli [3, 1998; Corollary 1].
f. Two vs. Three Player Games: Here, we have focused on two player games. The main
results (Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 5.1) extend to the three player case, up to issues of correlation.
Speciﬁcally, if we allow for correlated assessments in Deﬁnition 4.6, then we must also allow for
correlated assessments in Deﬁnition 5.1. A similar statement holds for the case of independence–
though, of course, care is needed in deﬁning independence for CPS’s. The central issue is that
Charlie’s belief about Bob should not change after Charlie learns information only about Ann.
Such property is easy to state in games with observable deviators. (See, e.g., Battigalli [2, 1996].)
Battigalli [2, 1996], Kohlberg-Reny [17, 1997], Stalnaker [26, 1998], and Swinkels [27, 1994] each
address this issue, for more general games.
Note, one additional issue that arises in the three player case: Should we require that Ann
28strongly believes “Bob and Charlie are rational”? Or should we instead require that Ann strongly
believes “Bob is rational” and strongly believes “Charlie is rational”? Arguably, in the case of
independence, we should require the latter.
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How does this aﬀect our analysis of games? Amend Figure 6.3, to a three-player game, as in
Figure 8.2. Consider a state at which there is RCSBR in the sense explained above, and let’s
ask which strategies can be played. Of course, using rationality, Charlie must play Across (at this
state). Note, now we require that a type of Bob strongly believe “Ann is rational” and also “Charlie
is rational.” So, conditional upon Bob’s information set being reached, this type must maintain a
hypothesis that Charlie is rational, and so that Charlie plays Across. In this case, there is a unique
best response–namely, to play In. Turning to Ann, we see that under an RCSBR analysis she will
choose In. So, we only get the backward induction outcome.11
This example also shows that, in the case of independence, Proposition 7.1(ii) does not hold.
Of course, if we instead consider the case of correlation and require that Bob strongly believe “Ann
and Charlie are rational,” then it may very well be the case that when Bob’s node is reached he
must forgo the hypothesis that Charlie is rational. Thus, in this case, we do have an analogue of
Proposition 7.1(ii). Indeed, both parts (i)-(ii) of Proposition 7.1 hold for the case of correlation.
g. Perfect Information Games: In Section 7, we analyzed perfect information games and
saw a connection between RCSBR and Nash outcomes. We already mentioned the connection to
Brandenburger-Friedenberg’s [12, 2004] SAS analysis. But there is another important connection
to be made, namely to Ben Porath [9, 1997; Theorem 2 ].
The starting point in Ben Porath [9, 1997] is “rationality and common initial belief of rationality.”
(A type initially believes an event if it assigns probability one to the event at the initial node. So, the
type may initially believe an event, but not strongly believe the event.) This does not give a Nash
outcome–for instance, in the Centipede Game of Figure 6.1, it would give {Out,Down}×{Out,In}.
However, Ben Porath goes on to show that, under an additional “grain of truth assumption,” a
Nash outcome does obtain (under a no ties condition). Interestingly, we may have a set of states
consistent with RCSBR, where the grain of truth assumption does not obtain. There is a question
11See Stalnaker [26, 1998] for a related idea.
29if Ben Porath’s conditions imply RCSBR–we do not know. Finally, we note that Ben Porath does
not address a converse (under a no ties condition).
Appendix A Self-Evident Events
Throughout the text, we informally argued that a type structure captures the idea that certain
beliefs are “transparent” to the players. In this Appendix, we formalize the statement. The idea
is that we will look at self-evident events and, in a precise sense clariﬁed below, these events will
correspond to the events that are “transparent” to players.
I. Self-Evident Events. Let us start with some preliminary deﬁnitions. Throughout, (Ω,B(Ω))
is separable metrizable.
Deﬁnition A1 Fix a CPS µ(·|·) : Ω×B(Ω)×E → [0,1] and an event E ∈ B(Ω). Say µ believes
E if, for each F ∈ E, µ(E|F) = 1.
In what follows, ﬁx a game Γ and a Γ-based type structure T =
￿
Sa,Sb;Sa,Sb;Ta,Tb;β
a,β
b
￿
.
Deﬁnition A2 Say a type ta ∈ Ta believes Eb ∈ B
￿
Sb × Tb￿
if β
a (ta) believes Eb.
Given an event Eb ∈ B
￿
Sb × Tb￿
, write B
a ￿
Eb￿
for Sa × {ta ∈ Ta : ta believes Eb}. When
Ea × Eb ∈ B
￿
Sa × Ta × Sb × Tb￿
, write B
￿
Ea × Eb￿
= B
a ￿
Eb￿
× B
b (Ea). Let us record two
properties of belief, which will become useful as we proceed. (The proof of the ﬁrst is straightforward,
and so omitted.)
Property Appendix A.1 (Monotonicity) Fix events Ea×Eb and Fa×Fb in B
￿
Sa × T a × Sb × Tb￿
.
If Ea × Eb ⊆ Fa × Fb, then B
￿
Ea × Eb￿
⊆ B
￿
Fa × Fb￿
.
Property Appendix A.2 (Conjunction) Fix a sequence of events Ea
1 × Eb
1, Ea
2 × Eb
2, ... each
in B
￿
Sa × Ta × Sb × Tb￿
. Then
￿
mB
￿
Ea
m × Eb
m
￿
= B(
￿
m
￿
Ea
m × Eb
m
￿
).
Proof. It is immediate from monotonicity that B(
￿
m
￿
Ea
m × Eb
m
￿
) ⊆ B
￿
Ea
m × Eb
m
￿
, for each m.
As such, B(
￿
m
￿
Ea
m × Eb
m
￿
) ⊆
￿
m B
￿
Ea
m × Eb
m
￿
. We now turn to the opposite inclusion, i.e.,
￿
m B
￿
Ea
m × Eb
m
￿
⊆ B(
￿
m
￿
Ea
m × Eb
m
￿
). Fix a type ta that believes each Eb
m, i.e., for each h ∈ Ha
and each m, β
a (ta)
￿
Eb
m|Sb (h) × Tb￿
= 1. Deﬁne Fb
m =
￿m
n=1 Eb
n and note that, for each h and each
(ﬁnite) m, β
a (ta)
￿
Fb
m|Sb (h) × Tb￿
= 1. Then, for each h ∈ Ha, β
a (ta)
￿￿
mFb
m|Sb (h) × Tb￿
= 1.
(This uses continuity of the probability measure β
a (ta)
￿
·|Sb (h) × Tb￿
.) Since, for each h ∈ Ha,
β
a (ta)
￿￿
m Eb
m|Sb (h) × Tb￿
= β
a (ta)
￿￿
m Fb
m|Sb (h) × Tb￿
= 1, ta believes
￿
m Eb
m.
Deﬁnition A3 Say Ea×Eb ∈ B
￿
Sa × Ta × Sb × Tb￿
is a self-evident event (in T ) if Ea×Eb ⊆
B
￿
Ea × Eb￿
.
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we will see that Ea×Eb is self-evident if and only if Ea×Eb obtains and there is common belief that
Ea × Eb obtains. More generally, a self-evident event always corresponds to the “transparency”
of some (possibly diﬀerent) event Fa × Fb. For example, a self-evident event may reﬂect the idea
that a certain event about “players’ beliefs over strategies”–i.e., a certain event about “ﬁrst-order
beliefs”–is transparent.
Fix Ea × Eb ∈ B
￿
Sa × Ta × Sb × Tb￿
, and iterate the belief operator B(·): B
0 ￿
Ea × Eb￿
=
Ea × Eb and, for each m ≥ 0, B
m+1 ￿
Ea × Eb￿
= B
￿
B
m ￿
Ea × Eb￿￿
.
Lemma A1 Fix an event Ea × Eb ∈ B
￿
Sa × Ta × Sb × Tb￿
. The following are equivalent:
(i) Ea × Eb is self-evident (in T );
(ii) Ea × Eb =
￿
mB
m ￿
Ea × Eb￿
;
(iii) Ea × Eb =
￿
mB
m ￿
Fa × Fb￿
, for some event Fa × Fb ∈ B
￿
Sa × Ta × Sb × Tb￿
.
Proof. We show that (i) implies (ii). First note, for each event Ea × Eb, B
0 ￿
Ea × Eb￿
∩
￿
m≥1 B
m ￿
Ea × Eb￿
⊆ E. So, it suﬃces to show that, if Ea × Eb is a self-evident event, then
Ea × Eb ⊆ B
m ￿
Ea × Eb￿
, for each m ≥ 1. The case of m = 1 follows immediately from the fact
that Ea ×Eb is a self-evident event. Assume this is true for m ≥ 1, i.e., Ea ×Eb ⊆ B
m ￿
Ea × Eb￿
.
Then, by monotonicity, B
￿
Ea × Eb￿
⊆ B
￿
B
m ￿
Ea × Eb￿￿
. So, again using the fact that Ea × Eb
is a self-evident event, we have that Ea × Eb ⊆ B
￿
Ea × Eb￿
⊆ B
m+1 ￿
Ea × Eb￿
.
Next note that (ii) implies (iii), by taking Ea = Fa and Eb = Fb. So, it suﬃces to show that
(iii) implies (i).
For this, ﬁx Ea × Eb, Fa × Fb ∈ B
￿
Sa × T a × Sb × Tb￿
with Ea × Eb =
￿
m≥0 B
m ￿
Fa × Fb￿
.
Note that
Ea × Eb =
￿
m≥0 B
m ￿
Fa × Fb￿
=
￿
Fa × Fb￿
∩ (
￿
m≥0 B
￿
B
m ￿
Fa × Fb￿￿
)
=
￿
Fa × Fb￿
∩ B(
￿
m≥0 B
m ￿
Fa × Fb￿
)
=
￿
Fa × Fb￿
∩ B(Ea × Eb),
where the ﬁrst and last lines use part (iii), the second line is by deﬁnition and the third line uses
conjunction. It then follows that Ea × Eb ⊆ B
￿
Ea × Eb￿
as required.
II. Type Structures as Self-Evident Events. We want to capture that a certain event is
transparent to the players. We have argued that idea is captured by the self-evident event concept.
But, in the main text, we modelled the idea that an event is transparent by writing down some
arbitrary type structure. How do the approaches relate? We will see that, in fact the approaches
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structures.” We ﬁrst present the formal statement, and then review.
We will want to map one type structure into a second larger structure, and argue that, by doing
so, we get a self-evident event. For this, it will be convenient to introduce some notation. Fix
separable metrizable spaces Ω,Φ. Given a measurable map f : Ω → Φ, write f : P (Ω) → P (Φ), for
the map where f (µ) is the image measure of µ under f. Note, f is measurable. (See Kechris [15,
1995; Exercise 17.40].)
Now, consider two Γ-based type structures, namely T =
￿
Sa,Sb;Sa,Sb;Ta,Tb;β
a,β
b
￿
and
T∗ =
￿
Sa,Sb;Sa
∗,Sb
∗;Ta
∗ ,Tb
∗;β
a
∗,β
b
∗
￿
. We will relate CPS’s in structure T to CPS’s in the structure
T∗. For this, it will be convenient to write id
a : Sa → Sa and id
b : Sb → Sb for the identity maps.
Lemma A2 Fix a measurable map τb : Tb → Tb
∗ and a CPS µa ∈ C
￿
Sb × Tb;Sb￿
. Deﬁne
νa so that, for each h ∈ Ha, (id
b ×τb)
￿
µa ￿
·|Sb (h) × Tb￿￿
= νa ￿
·|Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
. Then νa ∈
C
￿
Sb × Tb
∗;Sb
∗
￿
.
Proof. It is immediate that νa satisﬁes conditions (i)-(ii) of a CPS. For condition (iii), ﬁx
events E∗ ⊆ Sb (h) × Tb
∗ ⊆ Sb (i) × Tb
∗. Since a separable metrizable space is second countable,
(id
b ×τb)−1 (E∗) ∈ B
￿
Sb × T b￿
. It follows that
νa ￿
E∗|Sb (i) × Tb
∗
￿
= µa((id
b ×τb)−1 (E∗)|Sb (i) × Tb)
= µa((id
b ×τb)−1 (E∗)|Sb (h) × Tb) × µa ￿
Sb (h) × Tb|Sb (i) × Tb￿
= νa ￿
E∗|Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
× νa ￿
Sb (h) × Tb
∗|Sb (i) × Tb
∗
￿
,
as required.
Given CPS’s µa and νa as in Lemma A2, say νa is the image CPS of µa under id
b ×τb. We
write (id
b ×τb) : C
￿
Sb × Tb;Sb￿
→ C
￿
Sb × Tb
∗;Sb
∗
￿
for the associated map, i.e., so that (id
b ×τb)(µa)
is the image CPS of µa under id
b ×τb. Note, for this, we make use of the fact that the map id
b ×τb
is measurable. (This follows from second countability.) Indeed, throughout, we will repeatedly
make use of this fact.
Deﬁnition A4 Let τa : Ta → Ta
∗ and τb : Tb → Tb
∗ be measurable maps. Call
￿
τa,τb￿
a type
morphism from T to T∗ if (id
b ×τ
b
) ◦ β
a = β
a
∗ ◦ τa and (id
a ×τ
a) ◦ β
b = β
b
∗ ◦ τb.
Given separable metrizable spaces Ω,Φ, call a function f : Ω → Φ bimeasurable if it is
measurable and, for each E ∈ B(Ω), f (E) ∈ B(Φ).
Deﬁnition A5 Call
￿
τa,τb￿
a bimeasurable type morphism if it is a type morphism and τa
and τb are bimeasurable.
We can now talk about the relationship between the self-evident event concept and the maps
from one structure to a second larger structure.
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(i) Fix Γ-based type structures T =
￿
Sa,Sb;Sa,Sb;Ta,Tb;β
a,β
b
￿
and T∗ =
￿
Sa,Sb;Sa
∗,Sb
∗;Ta
∗ ,Tb
∗;β
a
∗,β
b
∗
￿
.
If
￿
τa,τb￿
is a bimeasurable type morphism from T to T∗, then Sa ×τa (Ta)×Sb ×τb ￿
Tb￿
is
self-evident in T∗.
(ii) Fix a Γ-based type structure T∗ =
￿
Sa,Sb;Sa
∗,Sb
∗;Ta
∗ ,Tb
∗;β
a
∗,β
b
∗
￿
and a self-evident event Sa×
Ea
∗×Sb×Eb
∗ ∈ B
￿
Sa × Ta
∗ × Sb × Tb
∗
￿
. Then, there is a type structure T =
￿
Sa,Sb;Sa,Sb;Ea
∗,Eb
∗;β
a,β
b
￿
and a bimeasurable type morphism from T to T∗.
Proof. Begin with part (i). Fix a bimeasurable type morphism, viz.
￿
τa,τb￿
. Since the maps τa
and τb are bimeasurable, Sa × τa (Ta) × Sb × τa (Ta) is contained in B
￿
Sa × Ta
∗ × Sb × Tb
∗
￿
. We
proceed to show that Sa×τa (Ta)×Sb×τb ￿
Tb￿
⊆ B
￿
Sa × τa (Ta) × Sb × τb ￿
Tb￿￿
. To show this,
it suﬃces to show that, for each τa (ta) ∈ τa (Ta) and each information set h ∈ Ha,
β
a
∗ (τa (ta))
￿
Sb × τb ￿
Tb￿
|Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
= 1.
(Again, bimeasurability guarantees that Sb × τb ￿
Tb￿
is Borel in Sb × Tb
∗.) But this follows from
the deﬁnition of a type morphism, since
β
a
∗ (τa (ta))
￿
Sb × τb ￿
Tb￿
|Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
= β
a (ta)
￿
Sb × Tb|Sb (h) × Tb￿
= 1.
Turn to part (ii). Take T a = Ea
∗, Tb = Eb
∗, and endow these sets with the relative topology.
(Recall that Sb × Eb
∗ ∈ B
￿
Sb × T b
∗
￿
, so that B
￿
Sb × Eb
∗
￿
⊆ B
￿
Sb × Tb
∗
￿
.) For each ta ∈ Ea
∗ , deﬁne
β
a (ta) so that, for each Fb ∈ B
￿
Sb × Tb￿
and each h ∈ Ha,
β
a (ta)
￿
Fb|Sb (h) × Tb￿
= β
a
∗ (ta)
￿
Fb|Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
.
Note, β
a (ta) deﬁnes a CPS with conditioning events Sa ⊗ Tb. To see this, recall that, for each
ta ∈ Ta = Ea
∗ and for each h ∈ Ha,
β
a (ta)
￿
Sb (h) × Tb|Sb (h) × Tb￿
= β
a
∗ (ta)(Sb (h) × Eb
∗|Sb (h) × Tb
∗) = 1,
where the ﬁrst equality is by deﬁnition and the latter equality is by the fact that ta ∈ Ea
∗ and
Sa × Ea
∗ × Sb × Eb
∗ is a self-evident event. This establishes condition (i) of a CPS. Conditions
(ii)-(iii) are immediate from the construction.
We ﬁrst show that T =
￿
Sa,Sb;Sa,Sb;T a,Tb;β
a,β
b
￿
is indeed a Γ-based type structure: It is
immediate that T a and Tb are separable metrizable. So, it suﬃces to show that β
a and β
b are
measurable. We show this for β
a, and an analogous argument establishes the result for β
b.
To show that β
a is measurable, it suﬃces to show that, for each information set h ∈ Ha, ta ￿→
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a (ta)
￿
·|Sb (h) × Tb￿
is measurable. Note that Tb = Eb
∗ ∈ B
￿
Tb
∗
￿
. So, there is a homeomorphism
f : P
￿
Sb (h) × Tb￿
→
￿
µ ∈ P
￿
Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
: µ
￿
Sb (h) × Eb
∗
￿
= 1
￿
.
(See Kechris [15, 1995; Exercise 17.28].) Now, ﬁx an event Gb ∈ B
￿
P
￿
Sb (h) × Tb￿￿
. Then,
f
￿
Gb￿
∈ B
￿
P
￿
Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿￿
. By measurability of the map β
a
∗, we have that
￿
ta
∗ ∈ Ta
∗ : β
a
∗ (ta
∗)
￿
·|Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
∈ f
￿
Gb￿￿
is Borel in Ta
∗ . But now notice that f is such that
￿
ta ∈ Ta : β
a (ta)
￿
·|Sb (h) × Tb￿
∈ Gb￿
=
￿
ta
∗ ∈ Ta
∗ : β
a
∗ (ta
∗)
￿
·|Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
∈ f
￿
Gb￿￿
∩ Ea
∗.
That is,
￿
ta ∈ Ta : β
a (ta)
￿
·|Sb (h) × Tb￿
∈ Gb￿
is an intersection of two measurable sets and so
measurable. This establishes that ta ￿→ β
a (ta)
￿
·|Sb (h) × Tb￿
is measurable, as required.
Finally, take τa : Ta → Ta
∗ and τb : Tb → Tb
∗ to be the identity maps. Certainly, they are
bimeasurable. We will show that
￿
τa,τb￿
is a type morphism. Fix a type ta ∈ Ea
∗ and we will
show that β
a
∗ (ta) is the image CPS of β
a (ta) under id
b ×τb. Fix a Borel set Fb
∗ in Sb × Tb
∗. For
each h ∈ Ha,
β
a
∗ (ta)
￿
Fb
∗|Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
= β
a
∗ (ta)
￿
Fb
∗ ∩
￿
Sb × Eb
∗
￿
|Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
,
since Sb × Ea
∗ × Sb × Eb
∗ is a self-evident event. As such,
β
a
∗ (ta)
￿
Fb
∗|Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
= β
a
∗ (ta)
￿
Fb
∗ ∩
￿
Sb × Eb
∗
￿
|Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
= β
a (ta)((id
b ×τb)−1(Fb
∗ ∩
￿
Sb × Eb
∗
￿
)|Sb (h) × Tb)
= β
a (ta)((id
b ×τb)−1(Fb
∗)|Sb (h) × Tb),
as required.
Lemma A3 says that if there is a bimeasurable type morphism from T to T∗, then T induces
a self-evident event in T∗. We now point out that we preserve RCSBR under the type morphism.
Speciﬁcally, suppose there is a bimeasurable type morphism, viz.
￿
τa,τb￿
, from T to T∗. Let
E∗(T ) be the self-evident event in T∗ corresponding to T .12 Then, there is RCSBR at the state
￿
sa,ta,sb,tb￿
(in T ), if and only if there is rationality and common strong belief of “rationality and
the self-evident event E∗(T )” at the state
￿
sa,τa (ta),sb,τb ￿
tb￿￿
∈ E∗(T ).
Proposition A1 Fix Γ-based structures T and T∗, so that there is a bimeasurable type morphism,
viz.
￿
τa,τb￿
, from T to T∗. Then, for each m,
(i) If
￿
sa,ta,sb,tb￿
∈ CSB
m ￿
Ra × Rb￿
then
￿
sa,τa (ta),sb,τb ￿
tb￿￿
∈ CSB
m
∗ (
￿
Ra
∗ × Rb
∗
￿
∩ (Sa ×
12That is, E∗(T ) = Sa × τa (Ta) × Sb × τb ￿
Tb￿
.
34τa (Ta) × Sb × τb ￿
Tb￿
)).
(ii) If
￿
sa,ta
∗,sb,tb
∗
￿
∈ CSB
m
∗ (
￿
Ra
∗ × Rb
∗
￿
∩(Sa×τa (Ta)×Sb×τb ￿
Tb￿
)), then (τa)
−1 (ta
∗),
￿
τb￿−1 ￿
tb
∗
￿
￿=
∅ and {sa} × (τa)
−1 (ta
∗) ×
￿
sb￿
×
￿
τb￿−1 ￿
tb
∗
￿
⊆ CSB
m ￿
Ra × Rb￿
.
To prove Proposition A1, it will be useful to introduce some further notation. Fix two type
structures T and T∗, and a type morphism, viz.
￿
τa,τb￿
, from T to T∗. For the structure T ,
write Ra,0 = R and Rb,0 = Rb. Then, for each m ≥ 0, set Ra,(m+1) = Ra,m ∩ SB
a ￿
Rb,m￿
and
Rb,(m+1) = Rb,m∩SB
b (Ra,m). It is easily veriﬁed that, for each m, Ra,m×Rb,m = CSB
m ￿
Ra × Rb￿
.
For the structure T∗, write R
a,0
∗ = Ra
∗ ∩ [Sa × τa (Ta)] and R
b,0
∗ = Rb
∗ ∩
￿
Sb × τb ￿
Tb￿￿
. Then, for
each m ≥ 0, set R
a,(m+1)
∗ = R
a,m
∗ ∩ SB
a
∗(R
b,m
∗ ) and R
b,(m+1)
∗ = R
b,m
∗ ∩ SB
b
∗ (R
a,m
∗ ). It is easily
veriﬁed that, for each m, R
a,m
∗ × R
b,m
∗ = CSB
m
∗ (
￿
Ra
∗ × Rb
∗
￿
∩ (Sa × τa (Ta) × Sb × τb ￿
Tb￿
)).
Lemma A4 Fix Γ-based structures T and T∗, and a type morphism, viz.
￿
τa,τb￿
, from T to T∗. If
(sa,ta) ∈ Ra, then (sa,τa (ta)) ∈ Ra
∗. Conversely, if (sa,ta
∗) ∈ Ra
∗, then {sa} ×(τa)
−1 ({ta
∗}) ⊆ Ra.
Proof. Fix some ta with τa (ta) = ta
∗. To show this result, it suﬃces to show that
margSb(h) β
a (ta)
￿
·|Sb (h) × Tb￿
= margSb(h) β
a
∗ (ta
∗)
￿
·|Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
,
for each h ∈ Ha. To see this, ﬁx some information set h ∈ Ha and some event Eb ∈ B
￿
Sb (h)
￿
.
Then, by deﬁnition of a type morphism,
β
a
∗ (τa (ta))
￿
Eb × Tb
∗|Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
= β
a (ta)(Eb×
￿
τb￿−1 ￿
Tb
∗
￿
|Sb (h)×Tb) = β
a (ta)(Eb×Tb|Sb (h)×Tb),
as required.
Proof of Proposition A1. Given the characterization above, we will show that the following
holds, for each m: (i) If (sa,ta) ∈ Ra,m, then (sa,τa (ta)) ∈ R
a,m
∗ . (ii) If (sa,ta
∗) ∈ R
a,m
∗ , then
∅ ￿= {sa} × (τa)
−1 ({ta
∗}) ⊆ Ra,m. And likewise for b.
We show this by induction on m. The case of m = 0 follows from Lemma A4. Assume the
result holds for some m ≥ 0 and we will show it also hold for m+1. Let us record two consequences
of the induction hypothesis:
Fact I: R
b,m
∗ =
￿
id×τb￿￿
Rb,m￿
: Fix
￿
sb,tb
∗
￿
∈ R
b,m
∗ . Then,
￿
sb,tb
∗
￿
∈ R
b,0
∗ and so tb
∗ ∈ τb ￿
Tb￿
. Fix
some tb with τb ￿
tb￿
= tb
∗. By the induction hypothesis,
￿
sb,tb￿
∈ Rb,m. So,
￿
sb,tb
∗
￿
=
￿
sb,τb ￿
tb￿￿
∈
(id
b ×τb)
￿
Rb,m￿
, as required. The converse follows immediately from the induction hypothesis.
Fact II: Rb,m =
￿
id×τb￿−1 ￿￿
id×τb￿￿
Rb,m￿￿
: Certainly, Rb,m ⊆
￿
id×τb￿−1 ￿￿
id×τb￿￿
Rb,m￿￿
.
Fix
￿
sb,tb￿
∈
￿
id×τb￿−1 ￿￿
id×τb￿￿
Rb,m￿￿
. Then, using Fact I,
￿
sb,τb ￿
tb￿￿
∈
￿
id×τb￿￿
Rb,m￿
=
R
b,m
∗ . By part (ii) of the induction hypothesis,
￿
sb,tb￿
∈ Rb,m, as required.
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First, ﬁx (sa,ta) ∈ Ra,(m+1). By the induction hypothesis, it suﬃces to show that τa (ta)
strongly believes R
b,m
∗ . First we show that R
b,m
∗ ∈ B
￿
Sb × Tb
∗
￿
. To see this, use Fact I, i.e.,
R
b,m
∗ = (id
b ×τb)
￿
Rb,m￿
. Since ta strongly believes Rb,m, it follows that Rb,m ∈ B
￿
Sb × T b￿
.
Using the fact that id
b ×τb is bimeasurable, we get that R
b,m
∗ is indeed Borel.
Now, ﬁx some information set h ∈ Ha with R
b,m
∗ ∩
￿
Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
￿= ∅. Note that
β
a
∗ (τa (ta))(Rb,m
∗ |Sb (h) × Tb
∗) = β
a (ta)((id
b ×τb)−1(Rb,m
∗ )|Sb (h) × Tb)
= β
a (ta)({
￿
sb,tb￿
:
￿
sb,τb ￿
tb￿￿
∈ Rb,m
∗ }|Sb (h) × Tb)
= β
a (ta)
￿
Rb,m|Sb (h) × Tb￿
where the ﬁrst line follows from the deﬁnition of a type morphism, the second line is by deﬁnition,
and the third line follows from the induction hypothesis. By part (ii) of the induction hypothesis,
Rb,m ∩
￿
Sb (h) × Tb￿
￿= ∅. So, with the above and the fact that ta strongly believes Rb,m,
β
a
∗ (τa (ta))(Rb,m
∗ |Sb (h) × Tb
∗) = β
a (ta)
￿
Rb,m|Sb (h) × Tb￿
= 1,
as required.
For the converse, ﬁx (sa,ta
∗) ∈ R
a,(m+1)
∗ and some ta ∈ (τa)
−1 (ta
∗). By the induction hypothesis,
it suﬃces to show that ta strongly believes Rb,m. Recall that ta
∗ strongly believes R
b,m
∗ and so
R
b,m
∗ ∈ B
￿
Sb × Tb
∗
￿
. By Facts I-II, plus the observation that id
b ×τb is measurable, Rb,m =
￿
id×τb￿−1 (R
b,m
∗ ) is Borel.
Now, ﬁx an information set h ∈ Ha with Rb,m ∩
￿
Sb (h) × Tb￿
￿= ∅. Note that
β
a (ta)
￿
Rb,m|Sb (h) × Tb￿
= β
a (ta)((id
b ×τb)−1((id
b ×τb)
￿
Rb,m￿
)|Sb (h) × Tb)
= β
a
∗ (τa (ta))((id
b ×τb)
￿
Rb,m￿
|Sb (h) × Tb
∗)
= β
a
∗ (τa (ta))(Rb,m
∗ |Sb (h) × Tb
∗),
where the ﬁrst line follows from Fact II, the second line follows from the deﬁnition of a type morphism,
and the last line follows from Fact I. By part (i) of the induction hypothesis, R
b,m
∗ ∩
￿
Sb (h) × Tb
∗
￿
￿= ∅.
So, with the above and the fact that τa (ta) strongly believes R
b,m
∗ ,
β
a (ta)
￿
Rb,m|Sb (h) × Tb￿
= β
a
∗ (τa (ta))(Rb,m
∗ |Sb (h) × Tb
∗) = 1,
as required.
III. Self-Evident Events vs. Type Structures. Let us review the approach taken here. We
begin with a game Γ, and we will consider the canonical Γ-based type structure, as constructed in
36Battigalli-Siniscalchi [5, 1999]. Write T∗ =
￿
Sa,Sb;Sa
∗,Sb
∗;T a
∗ ,Tb
∗;β
a
∗,β
b
∗
￿
for this structure. The
details of the construction will not be relevant. Instead, we will make use of two properties. First,
T∗ is complete–that is, β
a
∗ and β
b
∗ are onto. (See Footnote 2.) Second, T∗ is terminal–that is,
for each Γ-based structure T , there is a type morphism from T to T∗.13
We can use Lemma A1 to generate the self-evident events in T∗. To see this, return to the lady’s
choice convention. Let Fa
∗ = Sa × Ta
∗ and let Fb
∗ = Sb × {tb
∗ ∈ Tb
∗ : tb
∗ believes {Up} × Ta
∗ }. Then,
by Lemma A1(i)-(iii), we can ﬁnd some Ea
∗ ∈ B(Ta
∗ ) and Eb
∗ ∈ B
￿
T b
∗
￿
, so that Sa ×Ea
∗ ×Sb ×Eb
∗ is
a self evident event, with Sa ×Ea
∗ ×Sb ×Eb
∗ =
￿
mB
m ￿
Fa
∗ × Fb
∗
￿
. Certainly, each tb
∗ ∈ Eb
∗ believes
{Up}×Ta
∗. Moreover, for each CPS µa ∈ C
￿
Sb × Tb
∗
￿
(resp. µb ∈ C (Sa × Ta
∗ )) that believes Sb×Eb
∗
(resp. {Up} × Ea
∗), there is a type ta
∗ ∈ Ta
∗ (resp. tb
∗ ∈ Tb
∗) with β
a
∗ (ta
∗) = µa (resp. β
b
∗
￿
tb
∗
￿
= µb).
(Here, we use the fact that T∗ is complete.) Indeed, the proof of Lemma A1(iii) gives that these
types are in fact in Ea
∗ (resp. Eb
∗). So, by Lemma A3(ii), we can construct a type structure T ,
as described in Section 1.1. Let E∗ = Sa × Ea
∗ × Sb × Eb
∗ denote the self-evident event in T∗ that
corresponds to T . Using Proposition A1, RCSBR within the constructed structure T corresponds
to the event “rationality, E∗, and common strong belief of ‘rationality and E∗’” within the canonical
structure T∗.
So, we see that we can indeed approach the question of a lady’s choice convention, as we did in
the main text. No need to work directly with self-evident events (in the canonical construction).
Is this true more generally? Indeed, the answer is yes, and rests on the fact that the structure
T∗ is terminal. Because of this, we can ﬁnd a type morphism from each Γ-based structure T to
the canonical Γ-based structure T∗. When T satisﬁes certain conditions, the type morphism is
bimeasurable. So, in this case, Lemma A3 and Proposition A1 give that the two approaches are
equivalent. We will see that, in a certain sense, these conditions are “predominant.” Let us review.
We will impose two conditions on Γ-based type structure T . First, the type sets Ta and Tb
are standard Borel. Second, the type structure is countably uncountable–i.e., there are at most
a countable number of hierarchies (of conditional beliefs), so that the set of types that induce that
hierarchy is uncountable. In this case, the type morphism from T to T∗ is bimeasurable. (Here
we use Purves’ Theorem [21, 1966], Proposition 3.3.7 in Srivastava [25], and the fact that the map
from types to hierarchies is measurable.14) So, to the extent that we can restrict attention to
standard Borel countably uncountable structures, Lemma A3 and Proposition A1 give that the two
approaches are indeed equivalent.
Now: Can we indeed restrict attention to standard Borel and countably uncountable structures?
Yes. Begin with Theorem 5.1. Note that the type structure constructed in part (ii) is ﬁnite,
so certainly satisﬁes these conditions. Next turn to Lemma A3. Note that the type structure
constructed in part (ii) also satisﬁes these conditions. The fact that Ta and Tb are standard Borel
13The terminology is due to Böge-Eisele [10, 1979]. Battigalli-Siniscalchi [5, 1999] show their construction is
terminal, but they restrict attention to type structures with Polish type sets and continuous belief maps. The Online
Appendix extends terminality to separable metrizable type sets and measurable belief maps.
14See the Online Appendix, on this latter fact.
37follows from the fact that they are Borel subsets of a Polish space. The fact that the constructed
structure is countably uncountable follows from the fact that, in the canonical construction, no two
types induce the same hierarchies of beliefs.
Appendix B Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Property 4.1. Fix an event F ∈ E with F ∩
￿
m Em ￿= ∅. Then F ∩ Em ￿= ∅ for all
m. So, for each m, µ(Em|F) = 1. (This is because µ(·|·) strongly believes each Em.) But then
µ(
￿
m Em|F) = 1.
Proof of Property 4.2. Fix an event F ∈ E with F ∩ projΩ1 E ￿= ∅. Then (F × Ω2) ∩ E ￿= ∅.
Note that margΩ1 µ
￿
projΩ1 E|F
￿
is well deﬁned because projΩ1 E is Borel by assumption. Since µ
strongly believes E, µ(E|F × Ω2) = 1. Then certainly margΩ1 µ
￿
projΩ1 E|F
￿
= 1, as required.
Appendix C Proofs for Section 5
In what follows, we ﬁx a set of ﬁrst-order beliefs F = Fa × Fb, with Fa ⊆ C
￿
Sb￿
, Fb ⊆ C (Sa).
Lemma C1 Fix sa ∈ S
a,m+1
F , for m ≥ 0. There exists a CPS µa (·|·) so that sa ∈ ρa (µa (·|·)) and
µa (·|·) strongly believes each S
b,n
F for n ≤ m.
Proof. Fix sa ∈ S
a,m+1
F . Then, for each n ≤ m, there exists a CPS µa
n so that sa ∈ ρa (µa
n (·|·))
and µa
n (·|·) strongly believes S
b,n
F . We will show that there exists a CPS µa so that sa ∈ ρa (µa (·|·))
and µa (·|·) strongly believes each S
b,n
F for each n ≤ m.
Begin by constructing a CPS µa (·|·): For each information set h, set µa ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
= µa,n ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
where n = max{o : Sb (h)∩S
b,o
F ￿= ∅}. To see that µa (·|·) is indeed a CPS, ﬁrst note that conditions
(i)-(ii) are immediate from the construction. For condition (iii), ﬁx an events E ⊆ Sb (h) ⊆ Sb (i).
Note, there is some n ≤ m so that µa ￿
E|Sb (i)
￿
= µa,n ￿
E|Sb (i)
￿
. For this n, µa,n ￿
E|Sb (i)
￿
=
µa,n ￿
E|Sb (h)
￿
µa,n ￿
Sb (h)|Sb (i)
￿
, by condition (iii) of a CPS. If µa ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
= µa,n ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
,
then condition (iii) is immediate. If µa ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
￿= µa,n ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
, then Sb (h)∩S
b,n
F = ∅. By strong
belief, µa,n(S
b,n
F |Sb (i)) = 1. So, µa,n ￿
Sb (h)|Sb (i)
￿
= 0. Using the fact that E ⊆ Sb (h) ⊆ Sb (i),
we then have
µa ￿
E|Sb (i)
￿
= µa,n ￿
E|Sb (i)
￿
= 0
= µa ￿
E|Sb (h)
￿
µa,n ￿
Sb (h)|Sb (i)
￿
= µa ￿
E|Sb (h)
￿
µa ￿
Sb (h)|Sb (i)
￿
,
as required.
38It is immediate from the construction that sa is sequentially optimal under µa (·|·). (Simply use
the fact that sa is sequentially optimal under each µa,n (·|·).) Next, if Sb (h)∩ S
b,n
F ￿= ∅, then there
exists some o ≥ n with Sb (h)∩S
b,o
F ￿= ∅ and µa,o ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
= µa ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
. Using the fact that µa,o
strongly believes S
b,o
F , µa(S
b,o
F |Sb (h)) = 1. Since S
b,o
F ⊆ S
b,n
F , we also have that µa(S
b,n
F |Sb (h)) = 1,
as required.
Appendix D Proofs for Section 6
In this appendix, we prove that, for the ﬁnitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, any EFBRS results
in the Defect-Defect path of play. To show this, we will need to make use of certain properties of
EFBRS’s. We will again make use of these properties in Appendix E. We begin with the best
response property.
Deﬁnition D1 Say Qa ×Qb ⊆ Sa ×Sb satisﬁes the best response property if, for each sa ∈ Qa
there is a CPS µa (·|·) on Sb, so that sa ∈ ρa (µa (·|·)) and µa (·|·) strongly believes Qb. And similarly
for b.
An EFBRS satisﬁes the best response property. But the converse need not hold, i.e., Qa × Qb
may satisfy the best response property, but fail to be an EFBRS because it violates the maximality
condition. (See the example in Section 1.5.)
Let us introduce some notation, to relate the whole game to its parts. Fix a game Γ and a
subgame ∆. Write Ha
∆ for the set of information sets that are contained in ∆. We will abuse
notation and write Sa (∆) for the set of strategies of Γ that allow ∆. We also write Sa
∆ for the
set of strategies on subgame ∆. Note, each strategy sa
∆ ∈ Sa
∆ can be viewed as the projection of a
strategy sa ∈ Sa (∆) into
￿
h∈Ha
∆ Ca (h). Given a set Ea ⊆ Sa, write Ea
∆ for the set of strategies
sa
∆ ∈ Sa
∆ so that there is some sa ∈ Ea ∩Sa (∆) whose projection into
￿
h∈Ha
∆ Ca (h) is sa
∆. We will
write πa
∆ and πb
∆ for the payoﬀ functions associated with the subtree ∆. So, if
￿
sa,sb￿
allows ∆,
then π∆
￿
sa
∆,sb
∆
￿
= π
￿
sa,sb￿
.
Lemma D1 Fix a game Γ and a subgame ∆. If Qa × Qb satisﬁes the best response property for
the game Γ, then Qa
∆ × Qb
∆ satisﬁes the best response property for the subgame ∆.
Proof. If Qa
∆ × Qb
∆ = ∅, then it is immediate that Qa
∆ × Qb
∆ satisﬁes the best response property.
So, we will suppose Qa
∆ × Qb
∆ ￿= ∅.
Fix a strategy sa
∆ ∈ Qa
∆. Then there exists a strategy sa ∈ Qa ∩ Sa (∆) whose projection into
￿
h∈Ha
∆ Ca (h) is sa
∆. Since sa ∈ Qa, we can ﬁnd a CPS µa (·|·) : B
￿
Sb￿
× Sb → [0,1] so that
sa ∈ ρa (µa (·|·)) and µa (·|·) strongly believes Qb.
Let Sb
∆ be the set of all Sb
∆ (h) for h ∈ Ha
∆. Deﬁne νa
∆(·|·) : B
￿
Sb
∆
￿
× Sb
∆ → [0,1] so that, for
each event Eb ⊂ Sb and each Sb
∆ (h) ∈ Sb
∆, νa
∆
￿
Eb
∆|Sb
∆ (h)
￿
= µa ￿
Eb|Sb (h)
￿
. It is readily veriﬁed
that νa
∆ (·|·) is indeed a CPS on
￿
Sb
∆,Sb
∆
￿
.
39Since sa allows ∆ and sa is sequentially optimal under µa, it follows that sa
∆ is sequentially
optimal under νa
∆. Fix some Sb
∆(h) ∈ Sb
∆. If Qb
∆ ∩ Sb
∆ (h) ￿= ∅, then Qb ∩ Sb (h) ￿= ∅. So, in this
case, νa
∆
￿
Qb
∆|Sb
∆(h)
￿
= µa ￿
Qb|Sb (h)
￿
= 1. This establishes that νa
∆ strongly believes Qb
∆.
Interchanging a and b establishes the result.
We use Lemma D1 to show:
Lemma D2 Consider the N-repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, as given in Figure 6.2. If Qa × Qb
satisﬁes the best response property for this game, then each strategy proﬁle in Qa ×Qb results in the
Defect-Defect path.
Proof. The proof very closely follows the proof of Example 3.2 in Brandenburger-Friedenberg [12,
2004]. It is by induction on N. For N = 1, the result is immediate. Assume the result holds for
some N and we will show it holds for N + 1.
Consider some Qa×Qb of the N +1 repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma that satisﬁes the best response
property. Suppose, there is a strategy sa ∈ Qa that Cooperates in the ﬁrst period. Fix a strategy
sb ∈ Qb. If sb plays Cooperate (resp. Defect) in the ﬁrst period, Ann gets c (resp. e) in the ﬁrst
period. By Lemma D1 and the induction hypothesis, Ann gets a payoﬀ of zero, in periods 2,...,N.
So, for each sb in Qb, πa ￿
sa,sb￿
= c if sb plays Cooperate in the ﬁrst period, and πa ￿
sa,sb￿
= e if
sb plays Defect in the ﬁrst period.
Now, instead consider the strategy ra that plays Defect in every period, irrespective of the history.
Again, ﬁx a strategy sb ∈ Qb. If sb plays Cooperate in the ﬁrst period, then πa ￿
ra,sb￿
≥ d and, if
sb ∈ Qb plays Defect in the ﬁrst period, then πa ￿
ra,sb￿
≥ 0.
Putting the above together: Under any CPS that strongly believes Qb, we must have that ra is
a strictly better response than sa ∈ Qa, at the ﬁrst information set. But this contradicts Qa × Qb
satisfying the best response property.
Corollary D1 Consider the N-repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, as given in Figure 6.2. If Qa × Qb
is an EFBRS, then each strategy proﬁle in Qa × Qb results in the Defect-Defect path.
Appendix E Proofs for Section 7
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 7.1. We also further discuss the gap between parts (i)-(ii)
of the Proposition.
I. Proof of Proposition 7.1(i): This will follow immediately from the following Lemma.
Lemma E1 Fix a perfect-information game satisfying SPC. If Qa × Qb satisﬁes the best response
property, then each
￿
sa,sb￿
∈ Qa × Qb is outcome equivalent to a Nash Equilibrium.
40The proof of this Lemma closely follows the proof of Proposition 6.1a in Brandenburger-Friedenberg
[12, 2004]. It is by induction on the length of the tree. Speciﬁcally, ﬁx a game Γ and a subgame
∆. The induction hypothesis states that if a set satisﬁes the best response property on ∆ then it
is outcome equivalent to some Nash equilibrium. We saw that, if a set Qa × Qb satisﬁes the best
response property on Γ, it also satisﬁes the best response property on the subgame ∆. (This was
Lemma D1 in Appendix D.) So, if we ﬁx a set that satisﬁes the best response property on the
whole tree, then, by the induction hypothesis, it is outcome equivalent to a Nash equilibrium on
each reached subgame. The proof uses this fact to construct a pure strategy Nash equilibrium on
the whole tree, that is outcome equivalent to each proﬁle in Qa × Qb.
Let us begin ﬁlling in the dots.
Deﬁnition E1 Call Qa × Qa ⊆ Sa × Sb a constant set if, for each
￿
sa,sb￿
,
￿
ra,rb￿
∈ Qa × Qb,
π
￿
sa,sb￿
= π
￿
ra,rb￿
.
Lemma E2 Fix a perfect-information game satisfying SPC. If Qa × Qb satisﬁes the best response
property, then Qa × Qb is a constant set.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the tree.
First, ﬁx a tree of length one and suppose Ann moves at the initial node. Then Bob’s strategy
set is a singleton. So, if Qa×Qb satisﬁes the best response property, then Ann is indiﬀerent between
each
￿
sa,sb￿
and
￿
ra,sb￿
in Qa × Qb. By SPC, each proﬁle in Qa × Qb is outcome equivalent.
Assume the result holds for any tree of length l or less. Fix a tree of of length l + 1 and a set
Qa × Qb satisfying the best response property. Suppose Ann moves at the initial node, and can
choose amongst nodes n1,...,nK. Each nk can be identiﬁed with an information set and each is
associated with a subgame ∆ = k.
In particular, ﬁx some subgame k with Qa
k ×Qb
k ￿= ∅. Then Qa
k ×Qb
k satisﬁes the best response
property for the subgame k. (This is Lemma D1.) So, by the induction hypothesis, πk
￿
sa
k,sb
k
￿
=
πk
￿
ra
k,rb
k
￿
, for each
￿
sa
k,sb
k
￿
and
￿
ra
k,rb
k
￿
∈ Qa
k × Qb
k. Now, note that, for each sb ∈ Qb, sb
k ∈ Qb
k.
(Here, we use the fact that Ann moves at the initial node.) Thus, given two strategies sa,ra ∈
Qa ∩ Sa (∆) and sb,rb ∈ Qb, we have that π
￿
sa,sb￿
= π
￿
ra,rb￿
.
Now, ﬁx some
￿
sa,sb￿
,
￿
ra,rb￿
∈ Qa × Qb, where sa ∈ Sa (k) and ra ∈ Sa (j). We have already
established that π
￿
sa,sb￿
= π
￿
ra,rb￿
, for k = j. Suppose k ￿= j. Since sa ∈ Qa, sa is sequentially
optimal under some µa (·|·) that strongly believes Qb. So, in particular, sa is optimal under µa ￿
·|Sb￿
with µa ￿
Qb|Sb￿
= 1. With this,
πa ￿
sa,sb￿
=
￿
qb∈Qb πa ￿
sa,qb￿
µa ￿
qb|Sb￿
≥
￿
qb∈Qb πa ￿
ra,qb￿
µa ￿
qb|Sb￿
= πa ￿
ra,rb￿
.
(The ﬁrst equality follows from the fact that, for each qb ∈ Qb, πa ￿
sa,sb￿
= πa ￿
sa,qb￿
. This is
41a consequence of the last line in the preceding paragraph. Likewise, for the last equality.) By an
analogous argument, πa ￿
ra,rb￿
≥ πa ￿
sa,sb￿
. So, πa ￿
ra,rb￿
= πa ￿
sa,sb￿
. Using the single payoﬀ
condition, πb ￿
ra,rb￿
= πb ￿
sa,sb￿
.
Proof of Lemma E1. The proof is by induction on the length of the tree.
First, ﬁx a tree of length one and suppose Ann moves at the initial node. Then Bob’s strategy
set is a singleton. The result follows from the fact that each sa ∈ Qa is sequentially optimal under
a CPS.
Now assume the result holds for any tree of length l or less. Suppose Ann moves at the initial
node, and can choose among nodes n1,...,nK. Each nk can be identiﬁed with an information set
and each is associated with a subgame ∆ = k.
Fix some
￿
sa,sb￿
∈ Qa ×Qb and suppose sa ∈ Sa (1). Note, Qa
1 ×Qb
1 satisﬁes the best response
property (Lemma D1). So, by the induction hypothesis, there is a Nash equilibrium of subgame 1,
viz.
￿
ra
1,rb
1
￿
, so that π
￿
sa
1,sb
1
￿
= π
￿
ra
1,rb
1
￿
. Consider a strategy ra ∈ Sa (1) so that the projection
of ra onto
￿
h∈Ha
1 Ca (h) is ra
1. We need to show that we can choose rb
2,...,rb
K ∈ ×K
k=2Sb
k so that,
for each qa ∈ Qa and associated qa
k ∈ Sa
k, πa ￿
ra
1,rb
1
￿
≥ πa ￿
qa
k,rb
k
￿
. The proﬁle
￿
ra,
￿
rb
1,rb
2,...,rb
K
￿￿
will then be a Nash Equilibrium of the game.
Since sa ∈ Qa, there exists a CPS and an associated measure µa ￿
·|Sb￿
so that
￿
sb∈Sb
￿
πa ￿
sa,sb￿
− πa ￿
qa,sb￿￿
µa ￿
sb|Sb￿
≥ 0,
for all qa ∈ Sa. Fix k from 2,...,K. Using Lemma E2,
πa ￿
ra
1,rb
1
￿
= πa ￿
sa
1,sb
1
￿
≥
￿
sb
k∈Sb
k πa ￿
qa
k,sb
k
￿
(margSb
k µ
￿
·|Sb￿
)
￿
sb
k
￿
,
for any qa
k ∈ Sa
k. Letting
￿
qa
k,qb
k
￿
∈ argmaxSa
k minSb
k πa (·,·), we have in particular
πa ￿
ra
1,rb
1
￿
≥
￿
sb
k∈Sb
k πa ￿
qa
k,sb
k
￿
(margSb
k µ
￿
·|Sb￿
)
￿
sb
k
￿
.
But πa ￿
qa
k,qb
k
￿
≥ πa ￿
qa
k,qb
k
￿
for any qb
k ∈ Sb
k, by deﬁnition. So
πa ￿
ra
1,rb
1
￿
≥
￿
sb
k∈Sb
k πa ￿
qa
k,qb
k
￿
(margSb
k µ
￿
·|Sb￿
)
￿
sb
k
￿
= πa ￿
qa
k,qb
k
￿
.
Set (qa
k,qb
k) ∈ argminSb
k maxSa
k πa (·,·). By the Minimax Theorem for PI games (see, e.g., Ben
Porath [9, 1997]), πa ￿
qa
k,qb
k
￿
= πa(qa
k,qb
k). It follows that πa(ra
1,rb
1) ≥ πa ￿
qa
k,qb
k
￿
= πa(qa
k,qb
k).
But πa(qa
k,qb
k) ≥ πa(qa
k,qb
k) for any qa
k ∈ Sa
k, by deﬁnition. So πa(ra
1,rb
1) ≥ πa(qa
k,qb
k), for each
qa
k ∈ Sa
k. Setting each rb
k = qb
k gives the desired proﬁle.
II. Proof of Proposition 7.1(ii): Let us give the idea of the proof. We will start with a set
Qa×Qb =
￿￿
sa,sb￿￿
, where
￿
sa,sb￿
is a pure Nash equilibrium in sequentially justiﬁable strategies.
42This set will satisfy the best response property. (See Lemma E4 below.) In particular, the set Qa
is associated with a single CPS µa (·|·), satisfying the conditions of the best response property. We
will look at the set Pa of all strategies ra that are sequentially optimal under µa (·|·). We use the
fact that µa (·|·) strongly believes Qb (so assigns probability 1 to sb at the initial information set) to
get that Ann is indiﬀerent between all outcomes associated with Pa × Qb. Indeed, by NRT, these
strategy proﬁles must reach the same terminal node. Likewise, we deﬁne Pb and, using standard
properties of a PI game tree, we get that all strategies in Pa × Pb reach the same terminal node.
So, what have we done: We began with a set Qa × Qb and we expanded it to a set Pa × Pb,
with (i) Qa × Qb ⊆ Pa × Pb, (ii) all the proﬁles in Pa × Pb reach the same terminal node, and (iii)
there is a CPS µa (·|·) (resp. µb (·|·)) that strongly believes Qb (resp. Qa) and such that Pa (resp.
Pb) is the set of strategies that are sequentially optimal under µa (·|·) (resp. µb (·|·)). We would
have succeeded in constructing an EFBRS if the CPS µa (·|·) (resp. µb (·|·)) strongly believed Pb
(resp. Pa) instead of Qb (resp. Qa). The key will be that we can similarly expand Pa ×Pb so that
the new set satisﬁes similar properties. Since the game is ﬁnite, eventually, the expanded set must
coincide with the original set–that is, condition (i) must hold with equality. This gives the desired
result.
Now we turn to the proof. First, we give a technical Lemma.
Lemma E3 Fix some (Ω,E) where Ω is ﬁnite. Let µ(·|·) be a CPS on (Ω,E) and let 9 be a
measure on Ω. Construct ν (·|·) : B(Ω)×E → [0,1] as follows: If F ∈ E with Supp9∩F ￿= ∅ then
ν (·|F) = 9(·|F). Otherwise, ν (·|F) = µ(·|F). Then ν (·|·) is a CPS.
Proof. Let µ(·|·), 9, and ν (·|·) be as in the statement of the Lemma. Conditions (i)-(ii) of a CPS
are immediate. Turn to condition (iii). For this, ﬁx E ∈ B(Ω) and F,G ∈ E with E ⊆ F ⊆ G.
First suppose that Supp9 ∩ F ￿= ∅. Then
ν (E|G) =
9(E)
9(G)
=
9(E)
9(F)
9(F)
9(G)
= ν (E|F)ν (F|G),
where the ﬁrst equality makes use of the fact that E ⊆ G and the last makes use of the fact that
E ⊆ F and F ⊆ G. Next suppose that Supp9 ∩ G = ∅. Then Supp9 ∩ F = ∅, so that
ν (E|G) = µ(E|G)
= µ(E|F)µ(F|G) = ν (E|F)ν (F|G),
as required. Finally, suppose that Supp9 ∩ F = ∅ but Supp9 ∩ G ￿= ∅. Then
0 ≤ ν (E|G) ≤ ν (F|G) = 9(F|G) = 0,
43where the last equality follows from the fact that Supp9 ∩ F = ∅. Then
ν (E|G) = 0
= µ(E|F)9(F|G) = ν (E|F)ν (F|G),
as required.
Lemma E4 Let
￿
sa,sb￿
be a Nash equilibrium in sequentially justiﬁable strategies. Then
￿￿
sa,sb￿￿
satisﬁes the best response property.
Proof. Let
￿
sa,sb￿
be a Nash equilibrium in sequentially justiﬁable strategies. Then there exists
a CPS µa (·|·) so that sa is sequentially optimal under µa (·|·). Construct a CPS νb (·|·) so that
νb ￿
sb|Sb (h)
￿
= 1 if sb ∈ Sb (h), and νb ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
= µa ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
otherwise. By Lemma E3, νb (·|·)
is a CPS. It is immediate from the construction that sa is sequentially optimal under νb (·|·) and
νb (·|·) strongly believes
￿
sb￿
. And, similarly, with a and b reversed.
Deﬁnition E2 Fix a constant set Qa × Qa ⊆ Sa × Sb. Call Pa × Pa ⊆ Sa × Sb an expansion
of Qa × Qb if there exists a CPS µa (·|·) on
￿
Sb,Sb￿
so that:
(i) Qa ⊆ Pa = ρa (µa (·|·)),
(ii) µa (·|·) strongly believes Qb, and
(iii) if ra is optimal under µa ￿
·|Sb￿
then πa ￿
ra,sb￿
= πa ￿
sa,sb￿
for all
￿
sa,sb￿
∈ Qa × Qb.
And, likewise, with a and b reversed.
Notice, we only deﬁne an expansion of a set Qa × Qb, if Qa × Qb is a constant set. Also, note,
if Pa ×Pb is an expansion of Qa ×Qb then there are CPS’s µa (·|·) and µb (·|·) satisfying conditions
(i)-(iii) of Deﬁnition E2. We will refer to these as the associated CPS’s.
Lemma E5 Fix a PI game satisfying NRT. Suppose Pa × Pb is an expansion of Qa × Qb and ﬁx
associated CPS’s µa (·|·) and µb (·|·). Let Xa be the set of strategies that are optimal under µa ￿
·|Sb￿
.
And, likewise, deﬁne Xb. Then Xa × Xb is a constant set.
Proof. Since Pa × Pb is an expansion of Qa × Qb, Qa × Qb is a constant set. (This is by
deﬁnition.) It follows from condition (iii) of Deﬁnition E2 that Xa ×Qb and Qa ×Xb are constant
sets. Then, using NRT, each proﬁle in Xa × Qb reaches the same terminal node. And likewise for
Qa ×Xb. In fact, the terminal node reached by Xa ×Qb and Qa ×Xb must be the same one, since
￿
Xa × Qb￿
∩
￿
Qa × Xb￿
=
￿
Qa × Qb￿
. Now ﬁx a proﬁle
￿
sa,rb￿
∈ (Xa\Qa) ×
￿
Xb\Qb￿
. Note
there is a proﬁle
￿
sa,sb￿
∈ (Xa\Qa) × Qb and a proﬁle
￿
ra,rb￿
∈ Qa ×
￿
Xb\Qb￿
. These proﬁles
reach the same terminal node and so
￿
sa,rb￿
must also reach that terminal node. This establishes
that Xa × Xb is a constant set.
44Corollary E1 Fix a PI game satisfying NRT. If Pa × Pb is an expansion of some Qa × Qb, then
Pa × Pb is constant.
The next result is standard, and so the proof is omitted.
Lemma E6 Fix a measure µa ∈ P
￿
Sb￿
so that sa is optimal under µa given Sa. Then, for any
information set h with sa ∈ Sa (h) and µa ￿
Sb (h)
￿
> 0, sa is optimal under µa ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
given
Sa (h).
Given a measure µ ∈ P (Ω), we write Suppµ for the support of the measure.
Lemma E7 Fix a PI game satisfying NRT. If Pa × Pb is an expansion of Qa × Qb, then there
exists some Wa × Wb that is an expansion of Pa × Pb.
Proof. Begin with the fact that Pa×Pb is an expansion of Qa×Qb, and choose an associated CPS
µa (·|·) (resp. µb (·|·)) satisfying the conditions of Deﬁnition E2. Let Xa (resp. Xb) be the set of
strategies that are optimal under µa ￿
·|Sb￿
(resp. µb (·|Sa)). By Lemma E5, Xa ×Xb is a constant
set.
Construct a measure 9a ∈ P
￿
Sb￿
as follows: Begin with a measure 9a with Supp9a = Pb.
Construct 9b so that, for each rb ∈ Pb,
9a ￿
rb￿
= (1 − ε)µa ￿
rb|Sb￿
+ ε9a ￿
rb￿
,
where ε ∈ (0,1). Note that µa strongly believes Qb ⊆ Pb, Suppµa ￿
·|Sb￿
⊆ Pb. With this
and the fact that Supp9 = Pb, we have Supp9a = Pb. Using the fact that Xa × Pb is a
constant set, πa (sa,9a) = πa (ra,9a) for all sa,ra ∈ Xa. Moreover, when ε is suﬃciently small,
πa (sa,9a) > πa (ra,9a) for all sa ∈ Xa and ra ∈ Sa\Xa. So we can choose 9a so that sa is
optimal under 9a if and only if sa ∈ Xa.
Now construct a CPS νa (·|·) on
￿
Sb,Sb￿
as follows: If Pb ∩ Sb (h) ￿= ∅, let νa ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
=
9a ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
. (This is well deﬁned since, in this case, 9a ￿
Sb (h)
￿
> 0.) If Pb ∩ Sb (h) = ∅, let
νa ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
= µa ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
. Lemma E3 establishes that νa (·|·) is a CPS. Construct a measure 9b
on Sa and a CPS νb (·|·) on (Sa,Sa) analogously.
Take Wa = ρa(νa (·|·)) and Wb = ρb(νb (·|·)). We will show that Wa × Wb is an expansion of
Pa × Pb.
Begin with condition (i). Note, by deﬁnition, Wa = ρa(νa (·|·)). So, we only need show
that Pa ⊆ Wa. Fix some sa ∈ Pa. By construction, sa is optimal under 9a. Let h ∈ Ha with
sa ∈ Sa (h). If Pb∩Sb (h) ￿= ∅ then 9a ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
= νa ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
and sa is optimal under νa ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
among all strategies in Sa (h). (See Lemma E6.) If Pb∩Sb (h) = ∅ then νa ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
= µa ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
.
So, again, sa is optimal under νa ￿
·|Sb (h)
￿
given all strategies in Sa (h). With this, sa ∈ ρa(νa (·|·)),
as required.
45Next, turn to condition (ii). We need to show that νa (·|·) strongly believes Pb. For this notice
that if Pb ∩ Sb (h) ￿= ∅ then νa ￿
Pb|Sb (h)
￿
= 9a ￿
Pb|Sb (h)
￿
= 1.
Finally, we show condition (iii). Suppose ra is optimal under νa ￿
·|Sb￿
. We will show that
πa ￿
ra,sb￿
= πa ￿
sa,sb￿
for all
￿
sa,sb￿
∈ Pa × Pb. To see this, recall, νa ￿
·|Sb￿
= 9a. So, if ra
is optimal under νa ￿
·|Sb￿
then ra ∈ Xa. The claim now follows from the fact that Xa × Xb is
constant that contains Pa × Pb.
Replacing b with a establishes that Wa × Wb is an expansion of Pa × Pb.
Lemma E8 Fix a PI game satisfying NRT. Let
￿
sa,sb￿
be a Nash equilibrium in sequentially
justiﬁable strategies. Then there exists an EFBRS, viz. Qa × Qb, that contains
￿
sa,sb￿
.
Proof. Fix a Nash equilibrium in sequentially optimal strategies, viz.
￿
sa,sb￿
. Let Qa
0 × Qb
0 =
{sa}×
￿
sb￿
. By Lemma E4, Qa
0×Qb
0 satisﬁes the best response property. So, there is a CPS µa (·|·)
(resp. µb (·|·)) that strongly believes
￿
sb￿
(resp. {sa}) and sa (resp. sb) is sequentially optimal under
µa (·|·) (resp. µb (·|·)). Let Qa
1 = ρa (µa (·|·)) (resp. Qb
1 = ρb (µa (·|·))). Note that Qa
1 × Qb
1 is an
expansion of Qa
0 × Qb
0 (associated with the CPS’s µa (·|·) and µb (·|·)). Now, repeatedly apply
Lemma E7 to get sets Qa
0 × Qb
0, Qa
1 × Qb
1, Qa
2 × Qb
2, ..., where each Qa
m+1 × Qb
m+1 is an expansion
of Qa
m ×Qb
m. Since the game is ﬁnite, there is some M with Qa
m ×Qb
m = Qa
M ×Qb
M for all m ≥ M.
The set Qa
M × Qb
M is an EFBRS.
III. Closing the Gap: In the text, we mentioned that there is a gap between parts (i)-(ii) of
Proposition 7.1. We said that we do not know if part (i) can be improved to read: If Qa×Qb satisﬁes
the best response property, then each
￿
sa,sb￿
∈ Qa × Qb is outcome equivalent to a sequentially
justiﬁable Nash Equilibrium. Let us better understand the problem.
Return to Lemma E1 and the proof thereof. Suppose, we strengthened the induction hypothesis,
so that we can look at a sequentially justiﬁable Nash equilibrium of subgame 1, viz.
￿
ra
1,rb
1
￿
.
Following the proof, we use this, to construct a Nash equilibrium (ra,(rb
1,qb
2,...,qb
K)), where each
qb
k is the minimax strategy on subtree k. But, now we need to show that the constructed equilibrium
is sequentially justiﬁable. Here is where the problem arises–the strategy qb
k (on subtree k) may
not be a best response to any strategy on that subtree. Thus, the proof breaks down. Of course, it
may very well be that there is another method of proof.
Let us consider one related result, which may shed light on the gap. Consider a pure strategy
proﬁle
￿
sa,sb￿
and a mixed strategy proﬁle
￿
σa,σb￿
∈ P (Sa) × P
￿
Sb￿
. Call
￿
sa,sb￿
and
￿
σa,σb￿
outcome equivalent if π
￿
sa,sb￿
= π
￿
σa,σb￿
. Likewise, call Qa × Qb ⊆ Sa × Sb and
￿
σa,σb￿
∈
P (Sa) × P
￿
Sb￿
outcome equivalent if each
￿
sa,sb￿
∈ Qa × Qb is outcome equivalent to
￿
σa,σb￿
.
Then:
Lemma E9 Suppose Qa × Qb is a constant set satisfying the best response property. Then there
exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, viz.
￿
σa,σb￿
, so that:
46(i) Qa × Qb is outcome equivalent to
￿
σa,σb￿
, and
(ii) each sa ∈ Suppσa (resp. sb ∈ Suppσb) is sequentially justiﬁable.
Proof. Pick some
￿
ra,rb￿
∈ Qa × Qb and let µa (·|·) be a CPS so that ra ∈ ρa (µa (·|·)) and µa (·|·)
strongly believes Qb. Set σb = µa ￿
·|Sb￿
. Construct σa analogously.
First, notice that
￿
σa,σb￿
is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium: Begin by using the fact that
µb (Qa|Sa) = 1 and µa ￿
Qb|Sb￿
= 1. As such Suppσa × Suppσb ⊆ Qa × Qb. Since Qa × Qb is a
constant set, for each
￿
sa,sb￿
∈ Suppσa×Suppσb, π
￿
sa,sb￿
= π
￿
ra,rb￿
. So, for each sa ∈ Suppσa
and each qa ∈ Sa,
πa ￿
sa,σb￿
= πa ￿
ra,rb￿
= πa ￿
ra,σb￿
≥ πa ￿
qa,σb￿
,
where the inequality holds because ra ∈ ρa (µa (·|·)) and µa ￿
·|Sb￿
= σb. Applying an analogous
argument to b, establishes that
￿
σa,σb￿
is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
Next, notice that Qa × Qb is outcome equivalent to
￿
σa,σb￿
: To see this, recall that Suppσa ×
Suppσb ⊆ Qa×Qb and Qa×Qb is a constant set. So, it is immediate that, for each
￿
sa,sb￿
∈ Qa×Qb,
π
￿
sa,sb￿
= π
￿
σa,σb￿
.
Lastly, notice that each sa ∈ Suppσa is sequentially justiﬁable, and likewise for b: To see this,
recall that Suppσa×Suppσb ⊆ Qa×Qb. So, if sa ∈ Suppσa, then sa ∈ Qa, and so sa is sequentially
justiﬁable.
Putting Lemmata E2-E9 together, we get the following corollary:
Corollary E2 Fix a PI game satisfying SPC. If Qa ×Qb satisﬁes the best response property, then
there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, viz.
￿
σa,σb￿
, so that:
(i) Qa × Qb is outcome equivalent to
￿
σa,σb￿
, and
(ii) each sa ∈ Suppσa (resp. sb ∈ Suppσb) is sequentially justiﬁable.
Fix a perfect-information SPC game. Corollary E2 gives that, if we begin with a set satisfying
the best response property, we can construct an associated mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The
Nash equilibrium has the property that each strategy in its support is sequentially justiﬁable. But,
it is important to note that this does not give that the mixed strategy itself is sequentially justiﬁable.
Indeed, for non-PI games, we can construct a Nash equilibrium per Lemma E9, where the mixed
strategy is not sequentially justiﬁable. It remains open whether the same can be done in a perfect-
information SPC game.
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